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THE RAVE ACT: A SPECIOUS SOLUTION TO THE SERIOUS PROBLEM OF INCREASED ECSTASY
DISTRIBUTION WITHIN THE UNITED STATES THAT IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD
ERIN TREACY1
I. INTRODUCTION
The RAVE Act2 was designed to thwart use and distribution of the illegal street drug
ecstasy by holding the owner of a nightclub or other venue criminally responsible for any illegal
drug-related activities that occur at an electronic music3 concert held on his or her property.
Congress’ goal in passing the RAVE Act was to curtail ecstasy use by eliminating electronic
music concerts and raves in much the same way that crackhouses could be shut down: by holding
the property owners liable for crack use that took place on the property.
A rave is, in general, a party or a concert featuring electronic music, usually accompanied
by dancing. While no statutory definition of a rave exists, the legislative history of the RAVE
Act, as proposed in 2002, indicates that Congress was targeting two different types of raves.4 The
first type of rave identified by Congress is “held in a dance club with only a handful of people in
attendance.”5 The second type of rave is “held at a temporary venue such as a warehouse, open

1

Juris Doctor Candidate, Florida International University College of Law, 2005. The author would like to thank
Professors Angelique Ortega Fridman and Howard Wasserman for their invaluable insights and guidance and Nancy
Treacy, Devin Johns and Fran Meyer for their unwavering support.

2

See H.R. 718, 108th Cong. (2003). The acronym RAVE stands for Reducing Americans’ Vulnerability to Ecstasy;
see also S. 226, 108th Cong. §§ 1-4 (2003) (enacted).

3

For lack of a better term, this Comment will refer to the music found at both electronic music concerts and raves as
electronic music. The music is also referred to as techno or dance music. There are also many sub-genres, the details
of which are outside the scope of this Comment. See generally JIMI FRITZ, RAVE CULTURE: AN INSIDER’S
OVERVIEW (SmallFry Press 1999) [hereinafter FRITZ]; MIREILLE SILCOTT, RAVE AMERICA: NEW SCHOOL
DANCESCAPES (ECW Press 1999).
4

See S. 2633, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002).

5

Id.

4

field or empty building and has tens of thousands of people present.”6 For purposes of this
Comment and for clarity, the former will be referred to as an electronic music concert and the
latter as a rave. There is also a third type of “rave” that Congress did not identify: a large-scale
event featuring electronic music that is held in a large venue such as a sports arena or an
amphitheater.7 This type of event will also be referred to as an electronic music concert, as the
main difference between a rave and an electronic music concert is that a rave is usually
“underground,” unlicensed and unregulated; an electronic music concert is “mainstream” and
held in venues that are licensed and regulated by the city8 (and sometimes state) in which the
concert takes place.

II. THE HISTORY OF RAVES AND ECSTASY9
Use of the club drug ecstasy was popular in New York City’s gay male nightclubs in the
early 1980s. British disc jockeys (“DJs”) and performers who visited these New York nightclubs
returned to England endorsing the use of the drug, and ecstasy was introduced at electronic

6

7

Id.
Denver promoter Jason Bills [says] ‘I think it's ridiculous to assume that the sole reason I'm doing
an event at the Denver Coliseum is so that people can do drugs. We do parties in convention
centers and places where professional sports teams are playing, and we'd like to be held to the same
standards as any other concert promoter.’

See Jenny Eliscu, The War on Raves, ROLLING STONE, May 24, 2001, available at
http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v01/n817/a11.html (last visited June 5, 2004).
8

See infra Part VII A.

9

The author has made a good faith effort to trace the history of raves, electronic music concerts and the illegal street
drug ecstasy. However, since these phenomena are an “underground” subculture and the stuff of which urban
legends are made, there may be inconsistencies or alternate explanations for the research in this part of the
Comment. The author takes full responsibility for any such inconsistencies.
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music concerts and raves throughout England.10 The English rave phenomenon, in turn, was
exported back to the United States by New York DJ and electronic music promoter Frankie
Bones, who began throwing warehouse parties in the outer boroughs of New York11 in 1989.12
Since then, electronic music has become popular throughout the United States.13
A. “Rave culture,” MDMA and Ecstasy
1. “Rave Culture”
In the RAVE Act as proposed in 2002, Congress found that the “trafficking and use of
‘club drugs,’ including 3,4-methylenedioxymethampethamine [clinical MDMA] . . . is deeply
embedded in the rave culture.”14 Some rave attendees are drug free; some are not. A recent
clinical survey of electronic music concerts held in nightclubs in the United States found that
30% of participants tested positive for MDMA using a testing device called the
ORALScreen.™15 In another, 20% tested positive for ecstasy by saliva analysis.16 A recent and
encouraging German study indicates that ecstasy use is a transient, youthful phenomenon that

10

See Julie Holland, M.D., Ecstasy: A History, in ECSTASY: THE COMPLETE GUIDE: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT
(Julie Holland, M.D. ed., Park Street Press 2001); see also Utopian
Pharmacology, BLTC Research, available at http://mdma.net (last visited June 5, 2004).
THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF MDMA 17

11

See id. This is one theory on the birth of the rave phenomenon. Other urban legends will state that the “scene”
began in San Francisco, Chicago or other cities, but the main idea is that the music began in the United States, was
exported to England where it became associated with ecstasy, and then returned to various cities in the United
States.

12

Id.

13

See generally FRITZ; see also ECSTASY: THE COMPLETE GUIDE at 16-18 (providing a concise overview of the
different subgenres of electronic music that have become popular in different regions of the country).

14

See S. 2633, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002) (Finding No. 3).

15

See generally George S. Yacoubian, Jr., et. al., Estimating the Prevalence of Ecstasy Use Among Club Rave
Attendees, 31 CONTEMPORARY DRUG PROBLEMS (Spring 2004).

16

See Amelia M. Arria et al., Ecstasy Use Among Club Rave Attendees, reprinted in 156 ADOLESCENT MEDICINE
(Arch Pediatrics 2002), available at www.archpediatrics.com.
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people quickly outgrow once they reach their twenties.17 British use of ecstasy is falling
dramatically,18 as is ecstasy use here in the United States.19 This Comment does not argue that
there is no correlation between electronic music and ecstasy use. This Comment does argue that
the RAVE Act is not narrowly tailored to the government’s concededly compelling interest in
battling ecstasy distribution and is therefore unconstitutional.
As noted in the Introduction, there are two types of electronic music concerts: the first
and smaller one is usually held in a nightclub; the second type is larger and usually held in an
arena. Typically, an electronic music concert in a nightclub can cost between five thousand and
sixty thousand dollars to produce.20 This type of event usually features at least one international,
headlining DJ and several secondary talents from within the country or the local area.21 The
promoter of this type of event typically circulates a flyer in advance, will find an approved venue
with the appropriate licenses and permits for this kind of event, and will often seek support from
either City Hall or the police department in an effort to minimize the risk of potential problems.22
The owner of the venue typically does not seek out such a party promoter, but if the promoter

17

See Kirsten von Sydow et al., Use, Abuse and Dependence of Ecstasy and Related Drugs in Adolescents and
Young Adults – A Transient Phenomenon? Results From a Longitudinal Study, 66 DRUG AND ALCOHOL
DEPENDENCE 147-59 (2002).
18

See David McCandless, Goodbye Ecstasy, Hello 5-Meo-DMT: New Designer Drugs Are Just a Click Away;
Psychedelics Legal in US but Banned in UK Are Openly Available on the Internet, available at http://mdma.net/uk
(last visited Feb. 16, 2004).
19

Press Release, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Teen Ecstasy Use Cut by 25 Percent From Peak as Trend
Reverses; Three-Quarters of a Million Fewer Teens Using “Love Drug” (Feb. 25, 2003), available at
http://www.rwjf.org; Press Release, The University of Michigan, Ecstasy Use Falls For Second Year in a Row,
Overall Teen Drug Use Drops (Dec. 19, 2003), available at http://www.monitoringthefuture.org.

20

See FRITZ, at 108.

21

Id. at 109.

22

Id.
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approaches the business owner with a proposed arrangement by which the owner will profit, the
owner will usually agree to allow his property to be used for this specialized type of event.23
The second type of electronic music concert is a very large event, held in a stadium like
any other large concert.24 Events such as these can cost anywhere from one to five hundred
thousand dollars to produce, and require a well-financed, sophisticated and responsible
organization to administrate.25 They can feature dozens of DJs and many subgenres of electronic
music.26 The venues used are usually large sports centers and arenas, and as with large sporting
events, organizers are increasingly seeking sponsorship from major companies such as CocaCola, Sony and Camel Cigarettes.27 Like the small business owner, the owner of a large venue is
similarly open to holding these types of events, provided they are profitable. Thus, these largescale electronic music concerts are very similar to large-scale rock concerts, except that the
performers are creating a different style of music.
The second type of event Congress cited in the legislative history to the RAVE Act, the
true rave, is normally held in a temporary venue like a warehouse, open field or empty building
and has tens of thousands of people present.28 These true raves are underground events and,
23

See, e.g., Reducing Americans’ Vulnerability to Ecstasy Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 5519 Before the House
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 3 (2002)
(testimony of Graham Boyd, Director, Drug Policy Litigation Project, American Civil Liberties Union),
available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/boyd101002.pdf. According to Boyd, “Robert Brunet manages the
State Palace Theater in New Orleans . . . . Mr. Brunet hired James Estopinal to arrange and promote electronic music
concerts . . . .” Id.

24

See FRITZ, at 111-13.

25

See FRITZ, at 111; Eliscu, supra note 7. Denver promoter Jason Bills has staged “major events without incident
since 1993, investing six-figure budgets in productions that feature everyone from underground house kingpin
Armand Van Helden to DJ Jazzy Jeff.” Id.
26

Id.

27

See FRITZ, at 103.

28

S. 2633, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002).
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because they are not subject to any sort of regulation, are much more likely to be the sites of drug
use or distribution. These events, unlike an electronic music concert, are less likely to have
security or other protective measures.29 A policy of targeting these events would be more
narrowly tailored to the goal of eliminating ecstasy distribution.
2. MDMA
The drug trafficking that Congress hopes to curtail by shutting down electronic music
concerts is that of the street drug ecstasy, the pure form of which is
3,4-methylenedioxymethampethamine, or MDMA. MDMA was originally patented by the
Merck Pharmaceutical Company in 1914, after company scientists stumbled upon it while
attempting to create a new medication to stop bleeding.30 (As usual, the process of its synthesis
was patented).31 Merck did not mention any use for MDMA in its patent application.32 The
chemical formula for this drug lay dormant until it was rediscovered in the early 1970s by
chemist Alexander Shulgin,33 who introduced MDMA to some of his colleagues. Through these
contacts, in the 1970s, a group of Northern California psychotherapists was giving MDMA to

29

See FRITZ, at 104.

30

See DRUG IDENTIFICATION BIBLE 765, (Amera-Chem, Inc. 2001); ECSTASY: THE COMPLETE GUIDE, at 11.

31

See Holland, supra note 13, at 11.

32

Id.

33

Alexander "Sasha" Shulgin, Ph.D., is a pharmacologist and chemist known for his creation of new
psychoactive chemicals. After serving in the Navy, he earned his Ph.D. in Biochemistry from U.C.
Berkeley in 1954. In the late 50s and early 60s he did post-doctorate work in psychiatry and
pharmacology at U.C. San Francisco and worked briefly as research director at BioRad Laboratories
before becoming a senior research chemist at Dow Chemical Co. In 1960, Shulgin tried mescaline
for the first time. He then experimented with synthesizing chemicals with structures similar to
mescaline such as DOM. After leaving Dow in 1965 to become an independent consultant, Sasha
taught public health at Berkeley and San Francisco General Hospital. In 1967, he was introduced to
the possibilities of MDMA by an undergrad at San Francisco State University at a time when very
few people had tried MDMA.

See http://www.erowid.org/culture/characters/shulgin_alexander/shulgin_alexander.shtml (last visited June 5, 2004).

9

patients for terminal illness, trauma, phobias, drug addiction and other disorders.34 Its users
reported enhanced sensations, heightened feelings of empathy, self-acceptance and a general
feeling of relaxed euphoria.35 Psychotherapist Ann Shulgin called it a “penicillin for the soul.”36
These scientists did not publish their findings on the use of MDMA in a therapeutic setting and
the public did not become widely aware of this use of the drug until the San Francisco Chronicle
published a story about it in June of 1984.37
By the early 1980s, the height of the crack cocaine epidemic, MDMA appeared on the
recreational drug scene. A group of entrepreneurs in Texas began selling MDMA, under the
brand name Sassyfras38, over the phone and at certain nightclubs in Dallas39 and Forth Worth,
where over-the-counter sales were subject to tax.40 The tax revenue from this MDMA-fueled

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

See Holland, supra note 13, at 13; see also NICHOLAS SAUNDERS, E IS FOR ECSTASY, ch.3 n.141, available at
http://www.ecstasy.org/books/e4x/e4x.ch.03.html (last visited June 5, 2004). It appears that these psychotherapists,
like Shulgin, were synthesizing the MDMA themselves in basement laboratories or other clandestine locations.
These therapists believed that “no therapist has the right to give a psychoactive drug to another person unless and
until he is thoroughly familiar with its effects on his own mind . . . .” Id.
38

A natural form of the drug can be made from sassafras or nutmeg. The private psychotherapists in the United
States who were using MDMA in their clinical practice called it "Adam", an allusion to "being returned to the
natural state of innocence before guilt, shame and unworthiness arose." See Holland, supra note 13, at 13. An
anonymous street drug dealer claims that the name ecstasy was chosen mainly for marketing reasons. Id. The person
who allegedly named the drug has explained that “ecstasy was chosen for obvious reasons, because it would sell
better than calling it empathy.Id . Empathy would be more appropriate, but how many people know what it means?”
Id.; see also http://mdma.net (last visited June 5, 2004).
39

In Dallas, where alcohol was prohibited at the Southern Methodist University, students bought legal MDMA as a
substitute, paying by credit card. See http://www.a1b2c3.com/drugs/x_01.htm (last visited June 5, 2004).

40

See SIMON REYNOLDS, GENERATION ECSTASY: INTO THE WORLD OF TECHNO AND RAVE CULTURE 143 (Little,
Brown and Co. 1998).
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nightlife attracted the attention of Senator Lloyd Bentson, who urged the Drug Enforcement
Administration to make the drug illegal under the Controlled Substances Act of 1970.41
The DEA held hearings in February, June and July of 1985, at which therapists testified
as to the unique ability of MDMA to catalyze the therapeutic process and to enhance
communication between spouses, family members and therapist and patient.42 In 1988, ignoring
this testimony, the Drug Enforcement Administration classified MDMA as a Schedule I43 drug,
defined by the DEA as having high abuse potential and no medical value.44 Most recently,
MDMA was approved by the Food and Drug Administration for medical study on human test
subjects in 2001.45 These clinical trials are expected to begin soon.46
3. Ecstasy
The street drug ecstasy is not pure MDMA. Makers of street ecstasy often add other
stimulants such as ephedrine, phenylpropanolamine (PPA), caffeine, atropine and/or glyceryl
41

Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2004).

42

On behalf of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Dr. Lewis Seiden of the University of Chicago presented data
on MDA, a different drug that is a chemical relative of MDMA. It remains unclear as to why the DEA presented
evidence about a different drug. After all of the evidence was presented, Judge Francis Young recommended to the
Drug Enforcement Administration that MDMA be placed in Schedule III, which would allow clinical work and
research to proceed. See Holland, supra note 13, at 15.

43

Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2004). The statute states, in relevant part:
(1) Schedule I.-(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.
(B) The drug or other substance has no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.
(C) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under medical supervision.

44

Once a drug is classified as Schedule I, it is no longer available either by prescription or over the counter. See id.

45

A South Carolina psychiatrist, Dr. Michael Mithoefer, “plans to conduct psychotherapy sessions with 20 women
who suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder due to sexual assaults or other violence, and who haven't been helped
by other treatment.” See, e.g., http://www.cnn.com/2004/HEALTH/02/25/ecstasy.study/ (last visited June 5, 2004).
Twelve of the women will be given MDMA; eight will be given a placebo. The study was finally approved by the
DEA on February 24, 2004. Mithoefer says he has extensive experience in working with post-traumatic stress
disorder patients and he's “excited about the possibility of finding a better treatment for the hundreds of thousands of
Americans who suffer from the sometimes debilitating disorder.” Id.
46

Id.

11

guaiacolate to enhance the effects of their product.47 The effects of ecstasy can be very similar to
those of MDMA, the key ingredient. Psychotherapist R.D. Laing, who took pure MDMA at
Esalen, California in 1984 when it was still legal, said: "It made me feel how all of us would like
to feel we are anyway . . . smooth and open hearted, not soggy, sentimental or stupid."48 The
most familiar emotion experienced is that of being in love,49 and the most predictable feelings
experienced are those of empathy, openness, peace and caring.50 Users are affected emotionally
for usually four to six hours, and freely hug and touch one another.51 Their visual perception and
sense of time may be altered.52 Typically, the user will feel that “all is right with the world.”53
The psychological effects of ecstasy are typically much more pronounced than the physical
ones.54
The most common physical effects caused by ecstasy use include hyperthermia and
dehydration caused by elevated body temperatures from the drug combined with physical
exertion.55 The long term effects of ecstasy use are still unknown. While some scientific results
and studies suggest that heavy ecstasy use can cause long-term brain damage, much more

47

DRUG IDENTIFICATION BIBLE 767-68 (2001).

48

See SAUNDERS, E IS FOR ECSTASY ch.4 n.3, n.25, available at http://www.ecstasy.org/books/e4x/e4x.ch.04.html
(last visited June 5, 2004).
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Id. at n.132.

50
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mind at the time. Even genetic make up may affect the experience.
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research is needed to conclusively determine ecstasy’s clinical effects.56 Counterfeit ecstasy pills
containing stimulants such as ephedrine, phenylpropanolamine (PPA), caffeine, atropine and/or
glyceryl guaiacolate are sold on the street as pure MDMA, and are believed to be responsible for,
or involved in, a number of ecstasy overdoses.57 The added chemicals can cause permanent
brain damage or even death.58
Over the past few years, the federal government has recognized a threat to the public
safety in ecstasy use and launched law enforcement measures targeting the drug.59 Senator Biden
cited the death of a 17-year-old girl60 at a party in New Orleans as the catalyst to an assessment
of “raves” (defined in this Comment as electronic music concerts) in New Orleans, conducted by
the Drug Enforcement Administration that showed a “close relationship”61 between raves and
club-drug overdoses.62 In a two-year period, 52 raves were held at the State Palace Theater in
New Orleans,63 which has a capacity of 3,500 people.64 During that same period, approximately

56

See Holland, supra note 13, at 55.

57

See John A. Henry, M.D. & Joseph G. Rella, M.D., Medical Risks Associated With MDMA Use, in
ECSTASY: THE COMPLETE GUIDE, supra note 13, at 71-2.

58

See Matthew Baggott, M.D., and John Mendelson, M.D., Does MDMA Cause Brain Damage?, in ECSTASY: THE
COMPLETE GUIDE, supra note 13, at 110-45; Holland, supra note 13, at 55; SAUNDERS, E IS FOR ECSTASY: “The
most likely danger from taking [e]cstasy is consuming something else instead,” available at
http://www.ecstasy.org/books/e4x/e4x.ch.06.html (last visited June 5, 2004).
59

See, e.g., Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 290aa-5b); Illicit
Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 691; Ecstasy Awareness Act, H.R. 2962 IH,
108th Cong. (2003); Clean, Learn, Educate, Abolish, Neutralize and Undermine Production (CLEAN-UP) of
Methamphetamines Act, H.R. 834, 108th Cong. (2003).
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The girl was seventeen-year-old Jillian Kirkland of Monroeville, Alabama. See John Cloud, Ecstasy Crackdown:
Will the Feds Use a 1980s Anti-Crack Law to Destroy the Rave Movement?, TIME, Apr. 9, 2001, at 62-3.
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148 CONG. REC. S5706 (daily ed. June 18, 2002) (statement of Sen. Biden).

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

See Evelyn McDonnell, Antirave New World: A Bill in the Senate Designed to Go After Drug Use Has Fans of
Electronic Music Singing an Angry Tune, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 18, 2002, at E1. New Orleans' State Palace Theatre
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400 teenagers were treated at local emergency rooms for overdosing on drugs.65 Yet the
government later stipulated at trial that only 30-40 overdoses may have been related to the events
held at the State Palace Theater.66 Reports of ecstasy overdoses may be grossly exaggerated.67
The deaths attributed to ecstasy are relatively few, compared to the rapidly increasing
number of ecstasy tablets imported into the United States each year. The sum total of ecstasyrelated deaths for the five-year period 1994-1998 was twenty-seven.68 U.S. Customs seized
400,000 ecstasy tablets in 1997, 750,000 in 1988, 3,500,000 in 1999 and 9,300,000 in 2000.69
The Drug Enforcement Administration estimated that by June 2000, more than two million
ecstasy tablets were being smuggled into the United States each week.70 Typically, ecstasy is
smuggled into the U.S. hidden in luggage, or by way of human “mules” or falsely documented
airfreight shipments.71
B. Electronic Music

has a capacity of 3,500; Florida's Club La Vela, (the largest nightclub in the country) has a capacity of 6,000. Both
venues’ owners were prosecuted under the Crackhouse statute because somewhere in their vast confines, it was
charged, people were using drugs.
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148 CONG. REC. S5706 (daily ed. June 18, 2002) (statement of Sen. Biden); see also Information Bulletin: Raves,
National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 2001-L0424-004, April 2001, at 4, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/656/656t.htm (last visited June 11, 2004).
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http://thedea.org/statistics.html (last visited June 8, 2004).

69

DRUG IDENTIFICATION BIBLE 766.

70

Id.

71

Id.

14

The Department of Justice has called raves “high energy, all-night dance parties . . .
which feature dance music with a fast, pounding beat and choreographed laser programs.”72
Whether a legitimate electronic music concert or an underground rave, the acknowledged focal
points73 of the event are the music and the dance. This section of the Comment will examine how
innovations in technology have changed the way music is produced and consumed, and the
significance of these technological changes to live performances, culminating in a new breed of
modern artist: the DJ.
In the Western world, before the arrival of early music technology – the cylinder, the
gramophone, the phonograph or the player piano – music was conceptually associated with two
primary concrete forms: “an audible event (a performance) or a written abstraction of – or
prescription for – such an event (a score, a lead sheet, or some other kind of manuscript
containing musical notation).”74 The artist who played the written score on his musical
instrument was called the performer.75 The artist who wrote the written score, or musical
notations, was called the composer.76 Innovations in technology have, over time, blurred the
lines between these two distinct categories.77
72

Information Bulletin: Raves, National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 2001-L0424-004, April
2001, at 1, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/656/656t.htm (last visited June 11, 2004).
73

Id.
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Kai Fikentscher, There’s Not A Problem I Can’t Fix, ‘Cause I Can Do It In the Mix: On the Performance
Technology of 12-Inch Vinyl, in MUSIC AND TECHNOCULTURE 291 (René T.A. Lysloff & Leslie C. Gay, Jr. eds.,
2003).
75

See Leonard Kasdan & Jon H. Appleton, Tradition and Change: The Case of Music, 12 COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN
SOCIETY AND HISTORY 50, 58 (1970).
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Id.
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See KAI FIKENTSCHER, “YOU BETTER WORK!” UNDERGROUND DANCE MUSIC IN NEW YORK CITY 91 (2000);
ERIC SALZMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY MUSIC: AN INTRODUCTION 235 (H. Wiley Hitchcock ed., Prentice Hall 2002)
(1967); see generally Leonard Kasdan & Jon H. Appleton, Tradition and Change: The Case of Music, 12
COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY 50 (1970).
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1. New Technologies
With the advent of computerized keyboards in the 1950s, one musician could create
complex rhythms and harmonies that previously required a whole ensemble of musicians.78 Like
the piano, the computerized keyboard is simply an instrument; ultimately, its musical and
popular success depends on the talent of the musicians who use it.79
Perhaps the greatest tool for recording music was the arrival of the multitrack tape
recorder in the 1950s.80 From that point on, a recording no longer necessarily documented a
performance at all.81 Instead, it was a new type of musical manuscript, a “sonic score.”82 The
tape recorder eliminated the need for the composer to muster an ensemble orchestra.83 Put
another way, the recorded music could now reflect an illusionary performance.84 For example,
ensemble instruments could now be recorded individually, in sequence, and then be balanced
with each other in a final mix, which sonically represented a performance that had never really
taken place.85
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See Emilio Ghezzi, Il Computer come il pianoforte/Der Computer als Klavier [The Computer as a Piano], 5
ANNALI DI SOCIOLOGIA/SOZIOLOGISCHES JAHRBUCH 205 (1989). Note that some genres (e.g., rock) lend themselves
more easily to electronic instruments; classical music does not.
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Id; see also supra note 78, at 55: “It should be made clear that the computer is not composing the music but is
merely generating, modifying and storing materials at the direction of the composer.”
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See SALZMAN, supra note 80, at 151.
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See, e.g., Kai Fikentscher, “There’s Not A Problem I Can’t Fix, ‘Cause I Can Do It In the Mix: On the
Performance Technology of 12-Inch Vinyl,” in MUSIC AND TECHNOCULTURE 292-4 (René T.A. Lysloff & Leslie C.
Gay, Jr. eds., Wesleyan University Press 2003); SALZMAN, supra note 80, at 33-34; Leonard Kasdan & Jon H.
Appleton, Tradition and Change: The Case of Music, 12 COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY 50
(1970) (predicting that these new technologies would cause this effect).
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See id; see also FRANK TIRRO, JAZZ: A HISTORY 139 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1993).

83

Id.

84
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A prime example of this trend is the material recorded in a studio for the Beatles’
landmark album Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band, material that was impossible to be
performed onstage by its authors after its release in 1967.86 The Beatles, called “true children of
the electronic age,”87 used recording technologies to mix English music hall music with other
styles such as swing, rock-and-roll and classical chamber music, to make it their own.88 Their
later recordings89 have been called a move “toward larger forms and concepts; these albums are
not just collections of songs but have larger overall artistic and theatrical shape.”90 Although the
Beatles scored their initial successes as a live performing group,91 it was the recording medium
that became, in effect, the real instrument on which they played.92
Yet another new “instrument” that has revolutionized the way we think about music is the
DJ console or “set,”93 which typically consists of at least two turntables, a mixer and a pair of
headphones. In the 1970s, DJs did not work in recording studios but in bars, clubs, and
discotheques, where they were in direct contact with their patrons.94 Like “the swing band
leaders of the 1930s, disco [DJs] engaged with their dancing clientele directly and
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See Fikentscher, supra note 77, at 293.
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See SALZMAN, supra note 80, at 234.
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See SALZMAN, supra note 80, at 234-5.
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These recordings include albums such as Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band (1967) and Abbey Road (1969).
See SALZMAN, supra note 83, at 235.
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See FIKENTSCHER, supra note 80, at 36; see also infra note 118 and accompanying text.
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See Fikentscher, supra note 77, at 294.
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dynamically.”95 But “instead of playing saxophones or brass riffs on the bandstand, they played
records, and used turntables, mixers and amplifiers to create music that, although based on
sounds created, arranged and recorded by others, became ultimately ‘theirs.’”96
Today, rock and jazz ensembles, DJs and any other performers with strong experimental
or artistic points of view have come almost invariably to rely on synthesizers and other
instruments that can provide electronic sound modification, whether as an enhancement to live
performances or to create unique music wholly within the recording studio.97 Thus, these new
technologies have clearly changed the ways in which music is produced and consumed.
2. The DJ as Maestro of Electronic Music
The chief significance of the DJ’s role in the creation of electronic music lies not in the
use of new material (in the sense of traditionally- or electronically-generated sounds) but in the
fact that the composer is “communicating directly with his audience without an intermediary.”98
In the context of a rave or an electronic music concert, a mix refers to the blending of records
and perhaps sound effects, accomplished by the DJ with less sophisticated equipment (than that
of a recording studio) and in real time.99 A DJ’s live performance then actually constitutes a
‘remix,’ the term the DJ uses, for his own live mix using vinyl recordings that have been
previously mixed in the recording studio.100 In that sense, a ‘remix’ is comparable to a written
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Id.
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See SALZMAN, supra note 83, at 154.
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See supra note 78, at 55; see also Monica Ruz Santorras, Nouvelles Technologies et Nouvelles Activities
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(INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (ISA), D. Weibel trans. 1998).
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score in the context of classical Western music. This is how “musical authorship has become a
temporary and subjective issue.”101
a) DJ as Composer-Performer102
The approach of a composer to electronic music is in many respects quite different from
the approach of a composer to instrumental music.103 Although technology has simplified many
of his tasks, it has also placed greater responsibilities upon the composer.104 He now knows that
his work involves “not only the conception”105 but the performance of the composition as
well.106
Even as radio and sound film technologies evolved in the 1920s and 1930s, and recorded
music became abundant, both environments continued to present the music as if it were a live
broadcast, or a “make-believe concert.”107 Finally, though, innovative radio DJs such as Jack
Cooper and Martin Block began to present the recordings not as “make-believe concerts”;108
instead, they incorporated records into their radio shows, as basic elements for their own
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See id. at 50. This is not to say that a composition performed live by a DJ could not be recorded at the site of the
concert (something that is often done for commercial purposes with many types of music, but which is beyond the
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performances.109 Later, DJs in discotheques also used vinyl recordings to form the basis of their
own creative individual musical expression.110 Today, these vinyl recordings (or records) are as
indispensable to the DJ’s musical instruments (turntables, mixers, equalizers) as strings are to
violinists, harpists and guitarists.111 To deejay is to make new music in real time, using
recordings, turntables, mixers and sound reinforcement technology – originally designed for
recording and playback purposes only – in creative ways.”112
Among the DJ’s creative choices are the musical repertoire; the technology used to play
music for dancing; the techniques used to play, mix and remix records into the flow of one
musical performance; and the rapport and interaction between DJ and dancers.113 Today’s club
DJs usually use two or more turntables, an audio mixer, and two separate amplification systems
that will reach both the dance floor and the DJ booth.114 Together, these form “the console.”115
The coordination of two or more turntables and a mixer necessitates using the cross-fader control
on the mixer to control the flow and balance of two (or more) separate audio signal feeds. At the
same time, in addition to other optional considerations, the DJ must simultaneously control the
tempo, volume, and balance of timbres and textures; these skills are as crucial in the context of
an electronic music concert as they are with any other type of musical composition.116
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While the DJ is usually composer and performer at once, it is the DJ who has great skill
in composition who achieves more artistic success than those who possess only good technical
(performance) skills.117 Someone who has mastered the operation of two or even three turntables
and an audio mixer is not necessarily considered a good DJ.118 The DJ’s repertoire of music
usually travels with him or her, in the form of several crates of records.119 The compositional
skills, called “programming”120 by DJs, are “an art that can include a range of musical
considerations.”121 Programming encompasses the overall duration of a night of uninterrupted
music for dancing with its “slow and gradual increase of energy at the beginning, the pacing
toward one or several peaks that find their ultimate release in that last record,”122 followed by
silence at the end of the performance.123 Through the creative mixing of music recorded on vinyl
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excellent – emotionally they don’t do anything for me . . . . There is actually a message in the
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It is passages such as the above that lead some people who are unfamiliar with electronic music to assume that
electronic music lovers must be on drugs. Compare the above excerpt, taken from KAI FIKENTSCHER, “YOU BETTER
WORK!” UNDERGROUND DANCE MUSIC IN NEW YORK CITY 41 (2000) with the following excerpt from ROBERT
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more than we normally are, and that the world is more than it seems. That is cause enough for
ecstasy.
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and the various means of playback technology, DJs have become musical authors, producing
their own interpretations of prerecorded music, not only through the choice of repertoire but also
through their style of mixing.”124
In addition to the compositional skills, considered most important, a good DJ must also
possess “mixing” skills.125 The DJ, starting in the early days of radio in the 1920s, but especially
since the disco era of the 1970s, has played a crucial role in the process of redefining the role of
music technologies.126 This process has been marked by a shift of emphasis away from the
composition of written scores, or authoritative musical texts, and toward the creation of new
performance modes.”127 The DJ, then, is arguably a “visionary figure”128 who has helped to
bridge the transition from the analog to the digital era by redefining the turntable and sampler as
performance instruments.129 This “new virtuosity”130 is not “mere embellishment but an organic
part of the musical substance itself.”131
While the art of deejaying is
“sometimes not viewed as a very prestigious activity or profession to be
associated with the specific musical skills or techniques that traditional musicians
must acquire . . . . This perspective changes once one considers the twin turntable
124

See Fikentscher, supra note 77, at 302.
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at 299.
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enormously influential on almost every kind of new music.” Id at 232-33.
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set and the audio mixer as one instrument consisting of three units that have to be
operated simultaneously as well as synchronously in order to allow the artistry of
deejaying to emerge.”132

1) DJ Techniques
DJs employ three main technical skills in creating their unique brand of electronic music.
First, the technique of ‘slip-cueing’ allows a DJ to construct an “uninterrupted musical program
through the blending together of individual records to form one seemingly unending musical
soundscape.”133 The technique has also been called the ‘mixing’ of records, or a system of
“dovetailing one tune into another…designed to reduce disconcerting breaks in the music and [to
create] momentum.134 This is the most common way for a DJ to segue from one record to
another.135
A second common technique is the ‘fast cut.’136 Fast cutting involves a rapid, almost
instantaneous switch between turntables, usually just before the first downbeat of the section or
song about to be played.137
The third main technique that DJs use is the overlay.138 Overlays are achieved by playing
two records at the same time through the P.A. system for an extended period of time, often
lasting minutes. The aim is to “synchronize two different records so as to make them sound like
132

See Fikentscher, supra note 77, at 298-99.
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one piece of music (which they then become in the hands of an accomplished DJ).”139 When a
DJ “works a record,”140 the DJ becomes a performer.141
C. The Dance: The Audience’s Response to the DJ’s Performance
Electronic music evolved from house music, which evolved from disco.142 One author
has said that the main way that electronic dance music differs from traditional music is that
electronic dance music is not just about creating new sounds, but is also about learning to listen
to music in a different way.143 With conventional music, the audience tends to listen to the
structure of the song and follow the songwriter’s lyrics. By contrast, with electronic dance music,
the music is more cyclical and continuous, and often has few or no lyrics for the listener to focus
on.144 Thus, it has been said that the experience of listening to electronic dance music is much
like the experience the musician has when he creates the music, in that it requires concentration
and focus. Electronic dance music is specifically designed to inspire the intense physical desire
to dance.145
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Consider this account of New York DJ David Morales’ technique:
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“The shared cultural dimension that enables DJs and dancers to interact . . . is marked by
. . . tension between freedom and order.”146 This tension has been compared to the development
of free-form jazz,147 as “the interdependence of a rhythm section and a soloist in a jazz ensemble
is comparable to that of DJ and dancers. The rhythm section shares with the DJ a focus on pulse
and structure (harmonic and/or rhythmic), providing a foundation on which the soloist can
‘dance.’”148 The members of the audience at an electronic music concert or at a rave are like the
jazz soloists, as they are expected to “make their own choices in terms of . . . execution, in
relation to the performance . . . of . . . the ensemble.”149
“Dancing, the response to successful deejaying, involves the ‘listener’ actively. Dancing
transforms a ‘listener’ into a ‘dancer,’ whose performance has the often realized potential of
influencing the [DJ’s] programming, thereby creating a feedback loop between DJ booth and
dance floor.”150 “On the microlevel of rhythm, DJ and dancers interact by maintaining a balance
between constant features (pulse, meter, musical structure) and variable features (dynamics,
sound and repertoire). On the macrolevel, the music may be organized in sets, or according to
style or tempo or overall energy level. Combined, these considerations fall under the concept of
programming. Programming is understood as an art that puts the DJ in the position of
authority.151 Thus, a successful response from the dance floor is the DJ’s responsibility.
III. THE CRACKHOUSE STATUTE WAS CONSTITUTIONAL
146
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As stated in the Introduction, the RAVE Act is an amendment to the 1986 Crackhouse
statute. While the Crackhouse statute has been construed very narrowly by the courts and has
been upheld as constitutional, the RAVE Act faces formidable constitutional hurdles. This
section will examine how the Crackhouse statute was able to withstand challenges to its
constitutional validity, and how the statutory language lent itself to a narrowing construction by
the courts.
The first section of the Crackhouse statute (Section (a)(1)) made it illegal to “knowingly
open or maintain any place, for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any
controlled substance”152 and withstood at least two challenges for vagueness.153
First, the Eleventh Circuit upheld this provision in 1992, holding that a conviction under
this section of the Crackhouse statute required two mental elements: knowledge and purpose. As
applied to defendants whose acts were “so clearly within” the concept of knowingly maintaining
a place, the statute met constitutional scrutiny.154 That circuit noted that the inclusion of the two
intent elements within the statutory language itself, “knowingly” and “for the purpose of,” did
much to eliminate contentions of vagueness or unfairness of the statute as applied to criminal
defendants.
Second, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also rejected a criminal
defendant’s vagueness challenge that same year, holding that the statutory language was not
inherently ambiguous and could not reasonably be construed to criminalize simple consumption
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See United States v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Lancaster, 968 F.2d 1250 (D.C. Cir.
1992).
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the landlord comes to conduct repairs, paying rent for the premises and accepting the keys of the premises from the
landlord.
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of drugs in one’s home.155 Rather, the court found that the “for the purpose of” language of 21
U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) precluded the conviction of the “casual” drug user under the Crackhouse
statute.156
The second section of the Crackhouse statute (Section (a)(2)) criminalized the
management or control of “any building, room, or enclosure, either as an owner, lessee, agent,
employee, or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, or make available for use,
with or without compensation, the building, room, or enclosure for the purpose of unlawfully
manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance”157 and survived a vagueness
challenge on at least one occasion.158 The Southern District of New York found this provision of
the Crackhouse statute to be constitutional, and that the statutory terms “using” and “storing” did
not cause the Crackhouse statute to be impermissibly vague on its face.159 The Milani court
analogized the Crackhouse statute to penal statutes such as those criminalizing the conduct of
landlords of houses of prostitution and the National Prohibition Act, statutes whose facial
validity had long been assumed.160
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The Crackhouse statute was never challenged as overbroad, and the Supreme Court has
never considered the constitutionality of the Crackhouse statute on any basis.161
A. Elements of a “Crackhouse” Offense
The mens rea component to a “Crackhouse” offense, incorporated by the various courts
of appeal, virtually eliminated constitutional concerns of overbreadth. Section (a)(1) applied to
the property manager or owner using the premises for unlawful purposes himself. Section (a)(2)
applied to the property manager who allowed others to use the premises for unlawful purposes.
The elements of a Crackhouse offense were established through evidence linking the defendant
to the premises, in either a supervisory or managerial role, under Section (a)(1), or as a landlord,
under Section (a)(2).162
1. Section (a)(1)
To convict a defendant under the old Crackhouse statute, Section (a)(1), the jury had to
find that the defendant a) knowingly b) opened or maintained a place c) for the purpose of
manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance.163
a) Knowingly
The knowledge of a defendant could be imputed to him when a reasonable jury could
infer that the defendant would have come across and therefore known about drugs and drug
paraphernalia that were scattered throughout the house.164 Likewise, if the defendant did not
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The constitutionality of the Crackhouse statute has also been challenged on numerous occasions on double
jeopardy grounds, but such challenges are beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally Richard Belfiore,
Validity, Construction and Application of Federal “Crack-House Statute” Criminalizing Maintaining Place for
Purpose of Making, Distributing, or Using Controlled Drugs (21 U.S.C.A. § 856) 116 A.L.R. FED. 345 (1993).
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Onick, 889 F.2d at 1429.

28

have reason to know of any drugs or drug paraphernalia in the house, he would not be convicted
under Section (a)(1).165 The knowledge element was easier to prove if the defendant actually
lived on the premises.

b) Opened or Maintained a Place
This was typically the easiest element for prosecutors to establish, and the defendant was
usually charged with maintaining, rather than opening, the place. A court would find that a
defendant maintained a property if the defendant exercised sufficient “dominion and control”
over it; the dominion and control under this statute was more stringent than that of drug
possession statutes. In this context, “maintain” connoted a higher degree of continuity and
duration than mere constructive possession.166 The easiest way to charge the defendant with
maintaining the premises was by proving that he had legal title to, or paid rent for, the
property.167
c) For the Purpose of
The relevant “purpose” under Section (a)(1) was that of the defendant himself, and no
others.168 The defendant had to maintain the place for his own goal of manufacturing,
distributing or using drugs.169 It was not sufficient that he allowed others to use the property for
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Id.
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United States v. Morgan, 117 F.3d 849, 856 (5th Cir. 1997).
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United States v. Roberts, 913 F.2d 211, 221 (5th Cir. 1990). Juries have been allowed to infer that a criminal
defendant maintained a place with much less evidence – for example, when the defendant had hung clothes or had
traffic tickets in the closets of rooms where drugs and drug paraphernalia were found. Id.
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Chen, 913 F.2d at 190.
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such goals.170 The Seventh Circuit suggested that a finding that the defendant held a
“supervisory, managerial or entrepreneurial” role in a drug enterprise was one way to ascertain
whether the defendant had the requisite mental purpose for a conviction under Section (a)(1).171
2. Section (a)(2)
To convict a defendant under the old Crackhouse statute, Section (a)(2), the jury had to
find that the defendant a) managed or controlled a building, room or enclosure b) either as
owner, lessee, agent, employee or mortgagee and c) knowingly made it available for the purpose
of unlawfully manufacturing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.172
a) Managed or Controlled
Under this section, the defendant must have managed or controlled the building, room or
enclosure where drug use took place. This normally required that the defendant owned or had
legal title to the property.173
b) Owner, lessee, agent, employee or mortgagee
The plain language suggested that the defendant under this section could hold any
number of titles vis-à- vis the property and be held liable under Section (a)(2).
c) Knowingly Made it Available for the Purpose of
1) Knowingly Made it Available
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Id. Note that the majority of cases tried under the Crackhouse statute were prosecuted under Section (a)(1). See
infra notes 279-81 and accompanying text.
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Section (a)(2) required only that proscribed activity was present on the property, that the
defendant knew of the activity and allowed the activity to continue.174 The Tenth Circuit and the
District of Columbia Circuit both recognized, in analyzing the former Section (a)(2), that
knowledge of what goes on inside a house may be inferred from living therein.175 The Jenkins
court noted that the natural inference, with a house, is that those who live in the house know
what is going on inside it, particularly in the common areas.176 Thus, the defendant who
maintained a house primarily as a residence, or a commercial property as a business enterprise,
could nevertheless be convicted under Section (a)(2) if the defendant knowingly made the
premises available to other residents or businesspeople for purposes of drug manufacture,
distribution or use.177
2) For the Purpose of
Unlike the “purpose” element of Section (a)(1), which went to the purpose of the
defendant property-owner,178 the purpose at issue under Section (a)(2) is not that of the person
managing or controlling the building,179 it is the purpose of the people renting or otherwise using
the place for illegal activities.
Because it is harder to prove that a person knowingly made his property available
to others for illegal uses than it is to prove that a person knowingly used his own property
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175
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for illegal drug activities, the majority of cases that were tried under the Crackhouse statute
resulted in convictions under section (a)(1). The former Section (a)(2) was unusual in that the
purpose element applied to someone other than the actor.180 Notably, the majority of Crackhouse
cases involved actual crackhouses, where the properties had little or no legitimate value or use
unrelated to drug activity. Historically, legitimate businesses or residential homes were safe from
prosecution under the Crackhouse statute. The strict judicial construction of the Crackhouse
statute kept it within constitutional bounds and prevented it from being struck down as overbroad
or vague.
B. The Rationale of the Disorderly House
The rationale behind the Crackhouse statute was that it deterred property owners from
maintaining, or making their premises available as, a disorderly house. The term “disorderly
house” usually refers to houses of prostitution or ill fame, common gaming houses, or controlled
substance premises (crackhouses).181 A disorderly house may also be defined as “a dwelling
where people carry on activities that are a nuisance to the neighborhood” or “a dwelling where
people conduct criminal or immoral activities.”182
Statutes that penalize the maintenance of a disorderly house usually require the defendant
to know of the illegal use of the premises.183 A conviction under the Crackhouse statute required
proof that the defendant intentionally or knowingly opened or maintained the place for the use,
manufacture or distribution of controlled substances, or knowingly allowed others to use the
180

The Chen court found at least 16 federal criminal statutes that use the combination of “knowingly” and “for the
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knowledge. Id. at 190 n.9.
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place for illegal activities, although such a purpose need not be the sole or main purpose of the
premises.184

V. EARLY ATTEMPTS TO USE THE CRACKHOUSE STATUTE TO SHUT DOWN RAVES
The federal government originally tried to prosecute promoters of raves and electronic
music concerts under the Crackhouse statute and other federal drug laws. The four major targets
were Little Rock, Arkansas; Boise, Idaho; Panama City, Florida; and New Orleans, Louisiana,
and their prosecutions were characterized by Senator Biden as “two wins, a loss and a draw.”185
The “draw” referred to by Senator Biden was the government’s first effort to prosecute a
nightclub owner under the Crackhouse statute, the first prosecution of its kind in the country.186
The federal government’s first anti-rave initiative prosecuted under the Crackhouse statute was
launched in New Orleans with its case against the State Palace Theater, in which a United States
Attorney brought charges against Robert Brunet and Brian Brunet, the owners of Barbecue of
New Orleans (doing business as the State Palace Theater), and James Estopinal, the event
promoter at the State Palace.187 All defendants were offered plea deals that included a ban of
particular items188 from the State Palace, despite the fact that the defendants had taken measures
to prevent drug use on their property189 and the lack of any evidence that these men were
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See United States v. Morgan, 117 F.3d 849, 857; United States v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291. The mens reas of
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involved in any way with drug activity. They accepted the plea deal, to avoid the possibility of
serving time in jail, but later challenged the plea deal on constitutional grounds.190
Public reaction against the government’s prosecution mounted 191 and the judge ruled that
the defendants’ plea agreement should be enjoined, noting that while he did not doubt that the
government’s interest was in battling use of the drug ecstasy, “it seems that a total ban on
possessing and utilizing objects which are inherently legal items is not a narrowly tailored means
of achieving the goal of curbing drug use.”192 Ultimately, that decision was overturned on the
grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing to contest the injunction.193
The “loss” Senator Biden referred to, and the second true Crackhouse prosecution of an
electronic music concert, took place in Panama City, Florida, where police seized Blow Pops™
and bubblegum from the club's gift shop as evidence that the managers knew of, and consented
to, drug use.194 The prosecution pointed to items such as glowsticks, bubblegum and water to
prove that the CEO and the club’s general manager knew there was drug use within the club, and
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allowed it to continue.195 Prosecutors argued that these items were proof of drug use because
ecstasy causes a range of physical reactions when ingested, including heightened sensitivity,
more energy, uncontrollable clenching of jaw muscles and grinding of teeth, and elevated body
temperatures. What the prosecution failed to do, however, was establish that the presence of
these items on the premises was sufficient to establish that the defendants had imputed
knowledge of illegal activities occurring on the premises.196 The case went to trial but on
November 27, 2001 a jury acquitted the defendants of all charges after only seventy-five minutes
of deliberation.197
One of the two “wins” Senator Biden referred to was in Boise, Idaho,198 where federal
prosecutors have invoked the Crackhouse statute in the rave context several times since 2001.199
One rave promoter was charged with using his business to sell drugs at raves and sharing in drug
profits.200 Another rave promoter convicted and sentenced under the Crackhouse statute was
selling ecstasy at his own raves.201 Thus, the Crackhouse statute can be and is used against
unscrupulous drug distributors who also maintain the place where the drug distribution occurs.
The Boise case, then, provides an example of how the nightclub owner who acts just like a
195
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crackhouse owner could have been effectively prosecuted under the old Crackhouse statute, and
that the RAVE Act is unnecessary if the government’s objective202 is to prosecute unscrupulous

business owners. Now the Boise rave scene, if it still exists, has gone underground, according to
Boise Mayor Brent Coles.203
The other “win” referred to by Senator Biden was the Little Rock case,204 which involved
federal drug conspiracy charges against rave promoters who had people sell ecstasy for them at
raves. These defendants were actually convicted under conspiracy laws. The Crackhouse statute
was not used in this case at all.205 The Little Rock case demonstrates that drug conspirators can,
and should be, punished under existing federal drug laws.
No doubt, the government’s mixed results in using the Crackhouse statute to try to
prosecute electronic music promoters and business owners who provide a public forum for this
type of music were, at least in part, the impetus behind Senator Biden’s “tailoring” the
Crackhouse statute to the rave situation. No doubt, the new RAVE Act makes a prosecutor’s job
easier.206 However, in the “tailoring,” Congress actually expanded the language of the
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Crackhouse statute in a way that renders it substantially and unconstitutionally overbroad and
therefore violative of the First Amendment rights of many groups of people.

VI. THE HISTORY OF THE RAVE ACT
The RAVE Act was first introduced in the Senate on June 18, 2002.207 The House of
Representatives held hearings on the bill that October.208 In the Senate, two of the original cosponsors of the bill, Richard Durbin (D-IL) and Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Chair of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, took the rare step of withdrawing themselves as co-sponsors, citing
concerns that the bill lacked adequate protection for innocent property owners.209
Senator Leahy noted that the House Judiciary Committee heard evidence the previous
year that the Drug Enforcement Administration and prosecutors are now using the Crackhouse
statute to pursue “even business owners who take serious precautions” to avoid drug use at their
events.210 He also was concerned with the provision allowing civil suits that “dramatically
207
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required, they are usually the starting point of a committee’s consideration of a bill. See
http://congress.indiana.edu/learn_about/legislative.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2003).
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increases” the potential liability of business owners, and urged further consideration of this
provision, included in what he termed a “hastily-assembled package.”211 Senator Durbin
withdrew his support from the bill in September.212
Ultimately, Senate leadership never brought it up for a full Senate vote.213 The House
Subcommittee on Crime held a hearing on the bill but decided not to vote on it.214 Finally, both
the House and Senate versions of the RAVE Act died when the 107th Congress adjourned at the
end of 2002. In February of 2003, Senate supporters re-introduced the RAVE Act under a new
name (the Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act).215 The new bill did not contain the controversial
“findings” section included in the 2002 bill that found “raves have become little more than a way
to exploit American youth” and that the trafficking and use of “club drugs” is “deeply embedded
in the rave culture.”216
At the same time, a bill identical to the Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act was introduced
in the House under the old name RAVE Act.217 As opposition to the legislation grew, supporters
chose to bypass the traditional process and attach it at the last minute to an unrelated bill without
debate or a vote of Congress.218 Senator Biden slipped the RAVE Act into the “Amber Alert”
211
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bill.219 The final “Amber” bill was then sent to every Member of Congress for a final straight-up
or straight-down vote. Even those that opposed the RAVE Act had to vote for the final “Amber”
bill if they wanted to enact the provisions preventing child abductions.220 This is how the RAVE
Act, a controversial drug distribution bill, was passed into law as part of an omnibus bill to
protect children, at a time when child safety was a politically hot topic and one that could not be
delayed.221
In contrast, the Crackhouse statute was passed as part of an omnibus anti-drug bill:
“a bill to strengthen Federal efforts to encourage foreign cooperation in
eradicating illicit drug crops and in halting international drug traffic, to improve
enforcement of Federal drug laws and enhance interdiction of illicit drug
shipments, to provide strong Federal leadership in establishing effective drug
abuse prevention and education programs, to expand Federal support for drug
abuse treatment and rehabilitation efforts, and for other purposes.”222
As the Chen court noted, Section 856 “was enacted to ‘outlaw[] operation of houses or
buildings, so-called ‘crack houses’, where ‘crack’, cocaine and other drugs are manufactured and
used.”223 The Crackhouse statute was a natural fit into this larger bill that targeted drug use and
distribution on many different levels.
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VII. THE RAVE ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The RAVE Act may be challenged on any number of constitutional grounds, but this
Comment will examine the main constitutional challenge to the RAVE Act: its overbreadth.224
This section proceeds to examine how the substantial overbreadth of the statute chills the
exercise of constitutionally protected activities engaged in by electronic musicians, their
audience, electronic music promoters and even political organizations.
A. The Overbreadth Doctrine
A statute is overbroad when it is designed to punish activities that are not constitutionally
protected but includes within its scope activities that are protected by the First Amendment.225
The objectionable qualities of overbreadth rest chiefly upon “the danger of tolerating, in the area
of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and
improper application.”226 Justice Powell has said that the danger inherent in an overbroad law is
that it can furnish a “convenient tool” for harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local
prosecuting officials against particular groups.227 Justice Marshall has said that the Court will
224
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ultimately vindicate a person whose speech is constitutionally protected, “for the value of a
sword of Damocles is that it hangs – not that it drops.”228
1. Historical Origins
The fountainhead229 of the overbreadth doctrine was Thornhill v. Alabama,230 decided by
the Supreme Court in 1940. The plaintiff in that case was an individual seeking reversal of his
conviction for loitering and picketing under an Alabama statute prohibiting a person, without just
cause or legal excuse, to “go near to or loiter about the premises of”231 any person engaged in
lawful business for the purpose of influencing or inducing others to adopt any of certain
enumerated courses of action.232 The Court struck the Alabama statute on its face, holding that
the freedom of speech secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the government is
among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all persons.233
The main rationale for this doctrine is that an overly broad statute can have a chilling
effect234 on the First Amendment right to free speech. This rationale serves two main
functions.235 First, it serves as the reason for striking an overbroad law and ending its deterrence
of constitutionally preferred activities.236 Second, it directly answers the argument that courts
228
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Id. Thornhill was a union activist who was protesting his employer’s policy of not employing union laborers.
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Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 95.

234

See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 256 n.2 (1967); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1971); see also
Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 852 (1970).
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See Note, supra note 237, at 853-56.

236

Id.
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should act with judicial restraint until a claimant who is himself privileged has pursued all
normal channels of review first. The appreciation of the chill on potential litigants and its steep
potential costs237 – namely delay in as applied review and the intervening loss of rights – has led
certain Supreme Court justices238 to invalidate statutes on their face, rather than waiting for a
litigant to challenge the statute’s constitutionality on the basis of how it has been applied to him.
In this sense, the overbreadth doctrine has been called a prophylactic one, with its main purpose
to combat this chilling effect.239
The overbreadth doctrine has been called a “principled response to the systematic failure
of other methods of adjudication to protect first amendment rights adequately.”240 Since
Thornhill, the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine flourished for nearly thirty years under the
Warren Court, which tended to be protective of individual liberties.241 Under the Burger Court,
the doctrine appeared to be severely curtailed,242 namely by the holding in Broadrick v.

237

Id.

238

Among the most notable is Chief Justice Earl Warren (1953-1969). See Martin H. Redish, The Warren Court, the
Burger Court and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 NW U. L. REV. 1031 (1984).
239

See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 868 n.94 (1991). Professor Fallon,
in using the term “prophylactic,” refers to two things: 1) that the central Constitutional concern is to protect the
speech or expressive activity of persons other than those who are allowed to present overbreadth challenges; and 2)
that courts, especially the Supreme Court, have discretion to adjust the doctrine’s contours in light of their
assessment of the doctrine’s practical effects; see also Daniel Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law
Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 293-95
(1988) (arguing that the Constitution may require some rule or doctrine to protect Constitutional values, even when
it does not require any particular rule or doctrine); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term –
Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975). The prophylactic effect of the overbreadth
doctrine may be traced back to the origins of judicial review found in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
240

Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 846 (1970).

241

See supra note 241.

242

Id.
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Oklahoma243 that the overbreadth of a statute, particularly where conduct (not mere speech) is
involved must be “not only…real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s
plainly legitimate sweep.”244 The Burger Court, in what First Amendment scholar Martin Redish
has called an “overreaction” to the Warren Court’s approach to the overbreadth doctrine, placed
limits on the doctrine’s use “that seem to have no rhyme or reason, other than that they limit the
protective reach of the overbreadth doctrine.”245 The result was a retrenchment from the Warren
Court’s protective approach to individual liberties. After Broadrick, any case involving
expressive conduct had to be substantially overbroad.246
The Broadrick decision ostensibly created a limitation on the ability of individuals to
bring First Amendment overbreadth claims when the protected activity is expressive conduct,247
rather than “pure” (verbal) speech. Yet a glaring omission from the Broadrick opinion was any
reference to the traditionally cited “‘speech plus’ chestnuts.”248 The Court’s next overbreadth
opinion was a pure speech case that failed to mention Broadrick at all,249 and in its subsequent
decisions the Court appeared to abandon the distinction between expressive conduct and pure
243

413 U.S. 601(1973). Professor Redish has called this ruling the “watershed (or perhaps) Waterloo of modern
overbreadth analysis.” See supra note 241, at 1057.

244

See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.

245

See supra note 241, at 1032 n.7.

246

See id. at 1058.

247

Id.

248

See id. at 1059 n.152-4 (1984), citing “speech plus” opinions such as United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). The term “speech plus”
refers to speech that contains within it strong elements of action. See, e.g., Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615; Redish, 78
NW U. L. REV. 1031, 1058; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 988-89
(2d ed. 1983).
249

See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (city ordinance making it unlawful to “curse or revile or
to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police while in the
actual performance of his duty” was overbroad because the term “opprobrious” could be applied to statements that
were not likely to give rise to an immediate breach of the peace).
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speech entirely.250 In its next overbreadth case, the Court held that the “substantiality”
requirement of Broadrick was “sound”251 and should be applied to all First Amendment claims
of overbreadth, irrespective of whether the claim is one of expressive conduct or pure speech.252
Thus, today any claim that a statute is overbroad must meet this substantiality requirement.
The substantiality requirement has never been defined by the Supreme Court and is an
analytic nightmare.253 Under the analysis employed in both Broadrick and Ferber, the
substantiality of the overbreadth is determined on a comparative or relative basis, by comparing
the number of instances of unprotected activity reached by the challenged statute to the number
of instances of protected activity reached.254 If the ratio of unprotected activity to protected
activity is high, the statute can stand.255 If the statute reaches a relatively high proportion of
protected activities, the statute is struck.256
2. Modern Overbreadth257

250

Compare Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (declaring ordinance
prohibiting door-to-door or on-street solicitation of contributions by charitable organizations that do not use at least
seventy-five percent of their receipts for “charitable purposes” overbroad and the opinion makes no reference to the
“expressive conduct” limitation of Broadrick) (White, J.) with Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 618, 62021 (1971) (White, J., dissenting) (in which Justice White first urges application of the “conduct limitation” to an
ordinance involving essentially the same type of solicitous conduct at issue in Schaumburg).
251

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).

252

Id; see also Redish, supra note 241, at 1064.

253

Professor Redish argues that “by applying its code word –“substantiality”- instead of engaging in a careful
interest-balancing process, the Court disregards completely the essential function performed by the overbreadth
doctrine in the first place: to determine whether a valid statutory goal can be achieved by means less invasive of free
speech interests.” See Redish, supra note 241, at 1066.

254

Broadrick states that “particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly
legitimate sweep.” Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615 (emphasis added).

255

Id.

256

Id.

257

Modern overbreadth doctrine is also an analytic nightmare. See Marc Rohr, Freedom of Speech After Justice
Brennan, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 413, 422 (1993): “The entire Court . . . has been inconsistent in its
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While the substantiality requirement appears to be good common sense, more recent
decisions from the Supreme Court illustrate the problems inherent to the theory that
substantiality may be gauged by using a simple tally. Massachusetts v. Oakes258 provides a fine
example.259 While Justices Brennan and Scalia agreed that a statute prohibiting the production or
distribution of photos of children in particular forms of partial nudity was overbroad, the issue of
substantiality remained.260 For both Justices, the issue was largely one of how many family
photos existed, for example, of naked toddlers on the beach.261 Justice Brennan concluded that
there would be many such photos relative to the statute’s permissible applications.262 Justice
Scalia reached the opposite conclusion.263 Neither Justice was able to provide any numerical
estimate, let alone a reliable numerical estimate, as to how many acts by how many people in any
given year the statute might permissibly and impermissibly reach.264

application of announced limitations.” See, e.g, supra note 253 (Justice White appears inconsistent because he
endorsed application of Broadrick’s expressive conduct limitation to a statute addressing solicitous conduct in 1971;
by 1980, in an opinion he authored discussing essentially the same issue, Justice White apparently abandoned this
position).
258

109 S. Ct. 2633 (1989) (plurality opinion).

259
See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 894 (1991), in which
Professor Fallon points out the flaws in the Supreme Court’s logic in using such a formulaic approach to
overbreadth.
260

Id.

.
261

Id.

262

Oakes, 109 S. Ct. at 2645.

263

Id. at 2641.

264

See Fallon, supra note 242, at 894. Ultimately, the overbreadth challenge to the statute in question was rendered
moot when the Massachusetts legislature amended the statute.
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This unavoidable problem has led several First Amendment scholars265 to advocate
abandonment of the simple tally approach to gauging substantiality in favor of a more sensible
balancing test. Professor Fallon, for example, believes the Court should weigh: a) the state’s
substantive interest in being able to impose sanctions for a particular kind of conduct under a
particular legal standard, as opposed to being forced to rely on other, less restrictive substitutes
against b) the First Amendment interest in encouraging narrow statutes and avoiding as much as
possible the chilling of constitutionally protected conduct.266
The Court has suggested that “overbreadth” and “narrow tailoring” are different
expressions for the same constitutional defect.267 The narrowly tailored analysis is, by its nature,
a balancing test.268 While the Supreme Court has never explicitly abandoned the old

265

Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 894 (1991); Martin H. Redish, The
Warren Court, the Burger Court and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 NW U. L. REV. 1031 (1984);
Lawrence A. Alexander, Is There an Overbreadth Doctrine?, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 541, 553-54 (1985).
266

See Fallon, supra note 262. Professor Fallon calls this a version of the familiar First Amendment less-restrictivealternatives analysis. For a similar formula, see Lawrence A. Alexander, Is There an Overbreadth Doctrine?, 22
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 541, 553-54 (1985); see also Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J.
464 (1969) (this analysis is likely to be used “wherever the Supreme Court is serious about judicial review”);
Redish, supra note 245, at 1066-69 (advocating a balancing test).
267

See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (using the requirements of the two
terms interchangeably); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-20 (1972) (conflating overbreadth and
narrow tailoring analyses). But see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (when the Court uses a categorical
approach to free speech, as opposed to the balancing approach, the overbreadth and narrow tailoring tests identify
different constitutional defects); see also Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 959, 965 n.13
(1984) (treating substantial overbreadth and narrow tailoring requirements interchangeably, and noting that the term
“overbreadth” has been used “to describe a challenge to a statute that in all its applications directly restricts
protected First Amendment activity and does not employ means narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest.”); see also National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(noting that there does not seem to be an apparent difference between the two tests); Marc I. Isserles, Overcoming
Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV 359 n.259 (1998); Monaghan,
supra note 229, at 37 (“the Court has reacted interchangeably to ‘overbreadth’ and ‘least restrictive alternative’
challenges both inside and outside the First Amendment context.”)
268

See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also THOMAS E. BAKER & JERRE
S. WILLIAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN A NUTSHELL 138-43 (Thomson West Pub. Co. 2d ed. 2003) (1976), for
a concise yet comprehensive description of the different balancing tests the Supreme Court uses, and how and when
these tests are applied.
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substantiality formula, it has implicitly used such a balancing test in recent cases269 such as City
of Houston v. Hill,270 Osborne v. Ohio271 and City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co.272
These cases indicate that the Supreme Court cannot avoid ad hoc balancing when it seeks to
judicially review statutes that affect First Amendment rights.
B. The Overbreadth Analysis
This Comment seeks to make a contribution to the growing body of scholarship
advocating that the doctrine of overbreadth can play a limited role in checking the legislature
when it deliberately drafts an overbroad statute to obscure an improper purpose;273 and, in this
case, when the legislature deliberately drafts a very broad statute while failing to give adequate
consideration to the statute’s impact on First Amendment rights. As the modern overbreadth
cases and commentary support an approach to overbreadth analysis that focuses on whether the
statute has been narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, so will this
Comment, giving only limited consideration to the “substantiality” of the overbreadth of the
RAVE Act.

269

Even as far back as Ferber, Justice Stevens stated that he would “refuse to apply overbreadth analysis for reasons
unrelated to any prediction concerning the relative number of protected communications that the statute may
prohibit,” leading one commentator to speculate that Justice Stevens was in fact refusing to join his colleagues in
estimating the “substantiality” of the perceived overbreadth of any statute. See Marc Rohr, Freedom of Speech After
Justice Brennan, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 413, 422 (1993).
270

482 U.S. 451 (1987) (where the analysis plainly had a qualitative as well as a quantitative dimension).

271

110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990) (while the Court avoided classifying its analysis as balancing, it could not avoid a
somewhat open-ended balancing approach).
272

486 U.S. 750, 757-69 (1988) (standardless licensing statutes pose special threats to First Amendment values, as
they tend to mask invidious discrimination, thus insulating the statute from judicial review).

273

See, e.g, Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth, and Improper Legislative
Purpose, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 36 n.30; Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 38-39 (1975); Redish, supra note 229, at 138 n.150. This argument is implied
in David S. Bogen, First Amendment Ancillary Doctrines, 37 MD. L. REV. 679, 713 (1978), and Note, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 918-20 (1970).
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1. Narrowly Tailored274
In his introductory statements to S. 2633, Senator Biden explained that the new RAVE
Act was intended to “tailor” the Crackhouse statute to rave promoters’ actions.275 Later, after
opposition to the RAVE Act grew, he again stated that
“The purpose of my legislation is not to prosecute legitimate law-abiding
managers of stadiums, arenas, performing arts centers, licensed beverage facilities
and other venues because of incidental drug use at their events . . . . My bill would
help in the prosecution of rogue promoters who not only know that there is drug
use at their event but also hold the event for the purpose of illegal drug use or
distribution.”276
As part of an overbreadth analysis, the Court does not assess just the nature of the
government’s interest but also whether that interest could be served by means that would be less
intrusive of activities protected by the First Amendment.277 In this case, the government already
has many tools with which it can target the drug ecstasy - tools that do not violate an individual’s
constitutional rights. For example, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
(the Controlled Substance Act of 1970),278 the Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of
1996279 and the Chemical Diversion Trafficking Act280 may all be used to curtail the distribution

274

While some might say that the level of review should be intermediate under United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968), this Comment assumes that the conduct at raves is expressive and is therefore entitled to the strict
scrutiny of expressive conduct found in cases such as Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). See supra Part II,
Sections B and C for an illustration of why this conduct is expressive.

275

148 CONG. REC. S5706 (daily ed. June 18, 2002) (statement of Sen. Biden). It is unclear from the record whether
he was referring to parties held in nightclubs or parties held in open spaces; presumably, he intended to target both.
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148 CONG. REC. S10,218 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2002) (statement of Sen. Biden).
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See, e.g., Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 119 S. Ct. 636, 642 (1999); Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797 (1989); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 70 (1981); Village of
Schaumberg v. Citizens for A Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980).
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21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2004).
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21 U.S.C. § 872a (2004).

280

21 U.S.C. § 801 (2004).
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of ecstasy or the possession or distribution of the precursor chemicals needed to make the street
drug ecstasy. The Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000281 provides funds for school- and
community-based anti-drug abuse education programs. The government’s compelling interest is
satisfied with these more narrowly tailored statutes that do not burden First Amendment rights.
The main reason the statute is overbroad is that while it probably could aid law
enforcement in prosecuting rogue rave promoters, the RAVE Act sweeps too broadly into the
domain of precious First Amendment rights.
a) The RAVE Act’s Effect on First Amendment Rights
The RAVE ACT is overbroad because it punishes activities that are protected by the First
Amendment. Among these activities is music.282 The individual liberties that are most threatened
by the RAVE Act are those of three groups of people: 1) the DJs who create their unique styles
of electronic music live at their concerts; 2) their audiences, electronic music enthusiasts who
listen to the music and who sometimes engage in their own expressive conduct: rave dancing;
and 3) the electronic music promoters who encourage and foster the development of electronic
music by promoting electronic music concerts. Additionally, the broad language of the RAVE
Act enables law enforcement officials to prosecute other protected activities like association for
political purposes that are outside the electronic music context.283
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42 U.S.C. § 290aa-5b (2004).

282

See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (“Music, as a form of expression and
communication, is protected under the First Amendment” ); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65
(1981) (“[L]ive entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment guarantee”);
see also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
U.S. 546 (1975); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922
(1975); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972); Schacht v. United
States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). The Seventh Circuit has held that
wordless music is speech within the meaning of the First Amendment. See Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d
943, 950 (7th Cir.1983).
283

David Crisp, Free Drugs or Free Speech?, BILLINGS OUTPOST, June 12, 2003, available at
http://www.billingsnews.com/story?storyid=5213&issue=152. The event at issue in this case was a rock concert-
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1) DJ Performer-Composers:
As noted above in Part II A, the DJs at electronic music concerts and raves are
performing live. This Comment asserts that at their performances they are creating music, a form
of expression that is constitutionally protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.284
Unlike arts such as painting or literature, where there can only be one true original that possesses
authenticity,285 music is an art that depends on performance for realization.286 It is not
constitutionally sufficient to say that people can create music in the privacy of their own homes.
As Justice Blackmun stated in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim287: “[O]ne is not to have the
exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other place.”288
2) The Audience:
The listeners at an electronic music concert can assert their own independent claims to
violations of their First Amendment rights. Put another way, the audience to a communication
may assert a First Amendment right independent of the rights of the speaker.289 Where a speaker

benefit held by the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (“NORML”) to raise money to put a
medical marijuana initiative on the ballot in 2004.
284

See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 n.1 (1989) (“Music, as a form of expression and
communication, is protected under the First Amendment.”).
285

Wes Blomster, Electronic Music, 32 TELOS 65, 66 (1977).

286

Id. at 67.
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452 U.S. 61 (1981).

288

Schad, 452 U.S. at 78 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 146, 151 (1939)).

289

See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2390-91, 2394 (1996) (statutory
provision requiring cable system operators to segregate and block "patently offensive" sex-related material on leased
cable channels was unconstitutional on the ground that it imposed too great a burden on the First Amendment rights
of the viewing audience); United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 470 (1995)
(prohibition on the receipt of honoraria by federal employees imposed a “significant burden on the public's right to
read and hear what the employees would otherwise have written and said"); see also Smith v. United States, 431
U.S. 291, 319 n.18 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T] he First Amendment necessarily protects the right to
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exists, the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source, and to its recipients both.290
If the RAVE Act eliminates all raves and electronic music concerts nationwide and the DJ
cannot perform in public, the audience loses its opportunity to listen, which is a violation of its
First Amendment rights.291
The audience not only listens, but sometimes - as at other types of music concerts members of the audience dance.292 Just as the Court has explicitly recognized that music is
deserving of First Amendment protection,293 it has also explicitly afforded that same protection
to dance.294 While most of the Court’s cases have concerned nude dance and the expression
conveyed therein,295 this Comment argues that the dances performed at electronic music concerts

‘receive information and ideas.’” (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 92 S. Ct. 2576, 2581-82 (1972)); Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (the audience’s rights to
receiving a communication are reciprocal to those of the speaker, or source, of the communication), noted in Joshua
Waldman, Symbolic Speech and Social Meaning, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1844, 1861 n.83 (1997).
290

See, e.g, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(the protection afforded to communications runs both to the source of the communication and to the recipient of the
communication.)

291

Id.

292

See supra Part II C; see also Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, McClure v. Ashcroft, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2532 at ¶ 27 (E.D. La. Feb. 01, 2002) (No. 01-2573), vacated on other grounds McClure, 335 F.3d 404
(5th Cir. 2003). One dancer, Michael Behan, uses both glow sticks and masks in his performances. Prior to the ban
on glowing objects and masks in the State Palace Theater case, he often came in character, dressed as “Mr. Bunny,”
with his costume identifying him to other attendees as “a performance dancer and as somebody who would
distribute candy and various toys.” See id. As part of his costume, Behan would wear masks decorated with rabbit or
“other designs painted with glow paint.” Id. These performances were well-rehearsed, practiced in advance and
tailored to “be visually attractive to viewers who watched through refractive glasses.” Id. Other dancers and
attendees “often cleared space for [Behan] on the dance floor and gathered around to watch [his] dances, even
without refractive glasses.” Id.
293

See supra note 287.

294

See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2460 (1991); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452
U.S. 61, 66 (1981); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 116-17
(1972); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970). Of the nine Justices, only Justice Scalia believes the First
Amendment to be inapplicable to nude dancing. He agrees that the First Amendment protects expressive conduct but
only "where the government prohibits conduct precisely because of its communicative attributes . . . ." See Barnes,
111 S. Ct. 2456, 2466 (Scalia, J., concurring).
295

In the Court's post-Schad decisions it has consistently re-affirmed its position in Schad that nude dancing
performed as entertainment falls within the scope of the First Amendment. See FW/PBS, d/b/a Paris Adult
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and raves should also be protected under the First Amendment, and to an even greater extent
than nude dance, as the dancing at electronic music concerts and raves do not run afoul of
obscenity considerations.296
Whether the dance performed by members of the audience at an electronic music concert
or a rave is protected by the First Amendment depends on whether the conduct is expressive.297
An individual’s conduct is considered expressive if it is "sufficiently imbued with the elements
of communication."298 The Supreme Court developed a two-part test, the Spence test, to help
courts determine whether expressive conduct can be characterized as “speech”: 1) whether an
intent to convey a particularized message was present, and 2) whether the likelihood was great
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it."299 Later, the Court’s decision in
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale300 eliminated the requirement that the message from an expressive
association301 be particular.302 Thus, today the standard for whether conduct is expressive within

Bookstore II v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990); Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576 (1989) (Justice Brennan
declaring that Schad affords nude dancing protection under the First Amendment, and that modeling, like nude
dancing, "enjoys like shelter under the First Amendment.") (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Sable
Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) ("[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected
by the First Amendment"); Young v. Arkansas, 474 U.S. 1070 (1985) (Justice White recognizing the Court's
"repeated indications that barroom nude dancing is a type of expression that is protected under the First
Amendment") (White, J., dissenting); New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 719 (1980) (in
LaRue the Court recognized "the protected expression implicated by nude dancing") (Stevens, J., dissenting). But
see City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989) (social dancing is not constitutionally protected communicative
activity).
296
Information Bulletin: Raves, National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 2001-L0424-004,
April 2001, at 4, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/656/656t.htm. Most event attendees wear
“lightweight, loose-fitting clothes and dress in layers.” Id.
297

U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (Free speech is not limited to the spoken word, nor does it apply to a
limitless variety of conduct).

298

Spence v. State of Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (per curiam).

299

Id.

300

530 U.S. 640 (2000).

301

This Comment argues that the electronic music and dance community is an expressive association. See infra text
accompanying notes 320-21.
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the context of a parade303 or other expressive gathering is simply the determination that the intent
to convey a message was present and that the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it.
In applying the Spence test to the dances performed at electronic music concerts held at
the State Palace Theater in New Orleans, Judge Porteous in McClure v. Ashcroft304 found that the
test was met, that the dancers were acting as performance artists and that each performance by
each artist conveyed a different message,305 and that there was a great likelihood that the
audience who viewed these messages would understand the messages.306 The judge also found
that attendees of raves go not just for the music, but to dance and to watch the performance of
other dancers, whether they be on a stage or on the dance floor.307 Finally, the judge noted that
just because the DEA agents who investigated the raves did not understand the message that was
conveyed does not mean that a message was not both conveyed and understood.308 These

302

[A]ssociations do not have to associate for the “purpose” of disseminating a certain message in
order to be entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. An association must merely engage
in expressive activity that could be impaired in order to be entitled to that protection. For example,
the purpose of the St. Patrick’s Day parade in Hurley was not to espouse any views about sexual
orientation, but we held that the parade organizers had a right to exclude certain participants
nonetheless.

Dale, 530 U.S. at 655.
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See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), where the parade
organizers were a private group named the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, an unincorporated
association of individuals.
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See McClure v. Ashcroft, 2002 WL 188410 (E.D. La.) (2002), rev’d on other grounds, McClure v. Ashcroft, 335
F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2003).
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Usually the message was one of freedom or identity with a certain culture. See id.
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Id. at 8 (quoting Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1087 (1990)).
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"[W]e think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the
Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual." Id. (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 25 (1970)).
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performances are expressive conduct and are protected by the First Amendment.
The main argument against including rave dancing within the category309 of expressive
conduct that is protected by the First Amendment is that it is not expression at all, but mere
conduct.310 But the expression that is relevant to freedom of speech is “the expression of a
thought, sensation or emotion to another person.” (emphasis included).311 What dance expresses,
as Judge Flaum emphasized in Miller v. Civil City of South Bend,312 “is, like most art-particularly but not only nonverbal art--emotion, or more precisely an ordering of sights and
sounds that arouses emotion.”313 The dancers at electronic music concerts and raves are
expressing their emotions. Their dances, like the “unquestionably shielded”314 paintings of

309

This special category includes “symbolic speech” actions such as picketing (Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
102-04 (1940)); sleeping in a park (Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984),
assuming but not deciding that sleeping in a park is protected speech); wearing black armbands to protest the
Vietnam War (Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969)); flag burning to
protest governmental policies in general (Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989)); nude dancing to convey
eroticism (Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2456, 2460 (1991) and Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452
U.S. 61, 65 (1981)); see also John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Martin Redish, The Content Distinction in
First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981); Richard A. Seid, A Requiem for O’Brien: On the Nature
of Symbolic Speech, 23 CUMB. L. REV. 563 (1992); Joshua Waldman, Symbolic Speech and Social Meaning, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1844 (1997).
310

See U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety
of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea.”).
311

Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1091 (1990) (Posner, J. concurring), rev’d by Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (plurality opinion) (applying O'Brien to a prohibition of nude dancing in
nightclubs and declining to apply the Spence test). The Barnes opinion has been criticized by several First
Amendment scholars. See, e.g., Professor Alan J. Howard, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 897 (arguing that all three
rationales behind Barnes leave much to be desired); Professor Jed Rubenfeld, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 773 (arguing
that Barnes should have been decided using an obscenity analysis); Professor Richard Seid, 23 CUMB. L. REV. 563,
613 (arguing that content neutrality and the First Amendment cannot co-exist with respect to the same regulation).
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Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1091 (1990) (Posner, J. concurring), rev’d by Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (plurality opinion) (applying O'Brien to a prohibition of nude dancing in
nightclubs and implicitly declining to apply the Spence test).
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See supra note 307, at 569.

54

Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll,315 are not
expressing particular thoughts or ideas, but the Supreme Court has recognized that certain types
of art defy the Spence test.316 The creative dances performed at electronic music concerts and
raves are simply another form of abstract art.
3) Electronic Music Promoters:
The activities of the electronic music concert and rave promoters who organize these
creative events are also protected. The modern trend of the Supreme Court is to implicitly treat
the rights of expressive associations as a unified doctrine.317 The Court now seems to consider
social clubs, parades, civil rights groups and political parties as all being members of a larger
category of expressive associations.318 In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group,319 the Court considered the attempt of a gay advocacy group to march in Boston's St.
Patrick's Day parade. One might think that a parade would be considered the collective speech
of the marchers.320 Instead, the Court identified the "speaker" as the veterans' group321 that
organized the parade. If the speaker is the organizer, the legitimate electronic music promoter

315

Id.

316

Id.

317

See Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Amendment Plural: Expressive Associations and the First
Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483 (2001).
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See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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515 U.S. 557 (1995).
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Id.
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This private group, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, was an unincorporated association of
individuals. See id.
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can be considered the First Amendment speaker for this expressive association, the electronic
music and electronic dance community.322
4) Association for Political Purposes
The RAVE Act also impairs the individual’s right to assemble peaceably. The freedom of
association is derived from the freedom of speech and assembly set forth in the First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution.323 Association for purposes expressly related to the First Amendment
includes political, religious or expressive activities,324 but it is widely accepted that political
speech is at the core of First Amendment protection.325 This most protected type of speech has
been inhibited by the RAVE Act.
The RAVE act is supposed to be used to punish business owners and/or event promoters
who “knowingly” allow drug-related activities to take place at their events, but on its face the
Act has given free reign to law enforcement officials who are offended either by opponents of
the nation’s current drug policy or by gay rights groups, who frequently use concerts and raves
as fund-raising events.326 As Justice Brennan stated in City of Houston, Texas v. Hill: “Although
we appreciate the difficulties of drafting precise laws, we have repeatedly invalidated laws that
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The “rave culture” is one that is predominantly young and predominantly gay, and one where the message
conveyed by creative dance performances is one of peace, love, unity and respect (“PLUR”). The PLUR philosophy
is frequently seen on tickets, bumper stickers, t-shirts and other items sold at “raves.” See DRUG IDENTIFICATION
BIBLE 770, (Amera-Chem, Inc. (2001)). The “rave community” may now arguably be considered a political
association. See infra notes 340-41.
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U.S. CONST. amend. I.

324

RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
§ 20.41 (3d ed. 1999).
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See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15
(1976) (per curiam) (“The First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression.”); Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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See supra note 287.
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provide the police with unfettered discretion to arrest individuals for words or conduct that annoy
or offend them.” The RAVE Act is such a law.
Only two months after the RAVE Act was signed into law it was used by the Drug
Enforcement Administration to intimidate the owners of a Billings, Montana, Eagles lodge into
canceling a combined rock concert-benefit for the Montana chapter of the National Organization
for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) and Students for Sensible Drug Policy (SSDP).327
On the day the event was set to take place a Billings-based DEA agent presented the venue
owners with a copy of the RAVE Act, warning them that they could face a fine of $250,000 if
illicit drugs were found on the premises. The bands, most of whom played regularly at the venue,
were also approached and warned that their participation in the event could result in a fine.328
After consulting with their lawyers, the venue owners cancelled the event.329 This demonstrates
the chilling effect of the RAVE Act.
It has been alleged that the DEA disagreed with the group’s goal of raising money to put
a medical marijuana initiative on the ballot in 2004.330 The concert promoter/benefit organizer, a
student at a local university, later said that he would drop his activities in the NORML chapter at
Montana State University-Billings and in the SSDP group as a result of this incident.331 This is
yet another example of the RAVE Act’s chilling effect.
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Id.
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Id.
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See supra note 286.
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Id.

331

See supra note 287. The promoter-organizer, Adam Jones, was jailed for a probation violation the day before the
concert. He had been on probation for a year and a half after being caught with one half of a gram of psilocybin
mushrooms and was arrested the day before the benefit concert for failing to report a change in supervisors at his
job. Id.
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The arbitrary enforcement of this law is a serious problem that even the sponsor of the
bill has recognized. Senator Biden expressed his concerns to the DEA administrator over the
DEA’s actions in Billings, and the agency has allegedly implemented internal guidelines to make
it harder for the law to be abused. The DEA website, answering frequently asked questions about
the new law, says: “All DEA offices have been provided with guidance regarding the
implementation of this new statute. This guidance also establishes procedures within DEA to
obtain Headquarters review of proposed enforcement activity under the Act.”332 These new
enforcement procedures are not available to the public.333
These guidelines do not have the force of law and therefore do not provide any protection
for political dissenters who might want to hold a political rally but are concerned that the RAVE
Act will be used to shut down their event. In fact, when the RAVE Act was passed, civil liberties
groups, business associations and other groups associated with the “rave community”334 held a
rave/political protest on the lawn of the United States Capitol building335 on September 6,

332

See Information Bulletin: Raves, National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 2001-L0424-004,
April 2001, at 4, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/656/656t.htm (last visited June 11, 2004).
333
Id. An exhaustive search of the publications available on the Dep’t of Justice website did not reveal the
guidelines issued from headquarters to the field offices.
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See The RAVE Act of 2002, Electronic Music Defense & Education Fund, available at
http://www.emdef.org/s2633 (last visited June 8, 2004).
335

Note that the property owner who would be held liable in this hypothetical would be the United States
government. Presumably, the RAVE Act would never be used in such a scenario.

58

2002.336 It is possible that somewhere within that political protest someone was using illegal
drugs. Under the RAVE Act, as enacted, this type of political association could be suppressed.337
The RAVE Act on its face reaches not only raves but every kind of expressive, political
and cultural gathering imaginable, if any illegal substance could be found there. Professor
Monaghan argues that “the Court has a unique responsibility to educate the other federal
branches in the need for sensitivity to free-speech interests. A holding of invalidity for
overbreadth would, in effect, ‘remand’ the problem to the relevant branch for more finely tuned
attention to speech concerns . . .”338 Professor Monaghan also believes that the deterrence
rationale underlying the overbreadth doctrine might also dictate a special canon of federal
statutory construction against judicial narrowing.339 “It is the legislature’s duty to draft
legislation precisely, so that courts are not burdened with the task of ruling, on each case to come
before it, whether the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the defendant in that particular
case.”340
2. The Compelling Government Interest

336

See http://www.emdef.org/s2633/#protests (last visited June 8, 2004). The Washington D.C., Capital Lawn
protest was organized by Ravers Organized Against the RAVE Act (ROAR) and was attended by “civil libertarians,
health-care professionals, business leaders, and electronic music fans [who] joined together to publicly express their
opposition to the RAVE Act.” Compare this group with the parade organizers in Hurley, who were also a private
group (the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council) and an unincorporated association of individuals.
337

The “rave community” is arguably something of a political community, as the “protest party” is becoming
increasingly prevalent. See FRITZ, at 221-22 (referring to protests named the International Street Party and Make
Friends Not War (A Rave for Peace)). See generally MICHEL GAILLOT, MULTIPLE MEANING, TECHNO: AN ARTISTIC
AND POLITICAL LABORATORY OF THE PRESENT (Éditions Dis Voir 1998).
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Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 11 (1981).
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City of Houston, Texas v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 465 (1987); see also Justice Powell’s opinion in Erznoznik v. City
of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). When First Amendment rights are involved, “precision of drafting and clarity
of purpose are essential.” Id. at 217-18.
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Judge Porteous, in McClure v. Ashcroft,341 framed the government’s interest as “battling
the use of the drug ecstasy.”342 This is concededly a compelling interest that promotes the
public’s health and safety. But while Congress intended the RAVE Act to serve that government
interest and the larger concern of ecstasy distribution, it carelessly drafted the statute, thus
rendering it overbroad. The statute does not distinguish electronic music and the “rave culture”343
from the ecstasy use of some but certainly not all members of the audience;344 nor does it
distinguish between legitimate, licensed electronic music concerts and illegitimate raves.
The legislative history of the Rave Act reveals that the government’s purpose is not really
in reducing drug use and distribution in constitutionally valid ways. Rather, the government’s
purpose is to eliminate all electronic music concerts as a way of eliminating the drug ecstasy.
This is not only unrealistic; it is impermissible under the United States Constitution. An
impermissible legislative purpose can render an otherwise valid law unconstitutional,345 and the
legislative history of the RAVE Act is a smoking gun. While this principle is particularly clear in
341

See McClure v. Ashcroft, 2002 WL 188410 (E.D. La.) (2002), vacated on other grounds by McClure v. Ashcroft,
335 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2003).
342

Id.
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See supra Part II A; see also supra note 326.
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Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9, McClure v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2003).
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See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (ordinance dealing with the ritual slaughter of
animals did not have compelling governmental interest which would justify the targeting of religious activities – the
practice of the Santeria religion – despite the city’s claims that its interest lay in public health and the prevention of
cruelty to animals); Washington v. Seattle School District, 458 U.S. 457, 471 (1982) (“despite its facial neutrality
there is little doubt that the initiative was effectively drawn for racial purposes”); cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
407 (1989) (“we have limited the applicability of O’Brien’s relatively lenient standard to those cases in which the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”); see also Jed Rubenfeld, 53 STAN. L. REV.
767, 776 (2001): “The real function of the O’Brien test is nothing other than ascertaining the law’s purpose.” Over
twenty-five years ago, Paul Brest suggested that O'Brien's real teaching, despite the Court's contrary language, was
that "some motives are unconstitutional." See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional
Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 590 (1975) Elena Kagan has made a similar point not only about O'Brien, but
about the entire structure of contemporary free speech doctrine. See Elena Kagan, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414
(1996) ("[N]otwithstanding the Court's protestations in O'Brien . . . First Amendment law, as developed by the
Supreme Court over the past several decades, has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of improper
governmental motives.").
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equal protection cases,346 it is pertains as well to the government’s impermissible purpose in
targeting all musical events featuring electronic music.347
While there may be some correlation between electronic dance music and club drugs
such as ecstasy, jazz, rock, blues and every other modern genre of music have also included
some measure of characteristic drug use.348 For example, in the 1920s, jazz was associated with
marijuana; in the 1960s, rock music with LSD; in the 1980s, punk music with speed.349 Yet the
government has never before suggested that the musical gathering be prohibited.350 Law
enforcement historically and rightly focused on drug use and distribution,351 rather than the
associated music, dance or culture. All of this changed in 2001, when the Department of Justice
(DOJ) declared a law enforcement goal of eliminating (to use the term it used) “raves,”352 a term
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See Jed Rubenfeld, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 775 n.17 (2001), citing Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458
U.S. 457, 471 (1982) (striking down formally race-neutral law enacted by statewide referendum where "despite its
facial neutrality there is little doubt that the initiative was effectively drawn for racial purposes" and that it was
beyond reasonable dispute that the initiative was enacted "'because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects
upon a racial minority); see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Purpose of Purpose Analysis, 107 YALE L.J. 2685 (1998).
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Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants James Estopinal’s and Brian Brunet’s Motion
to Dismiss the Indictment at 23, United States v. Robert J. Brunet, Brian J. Brunet, and James D. Estopinal (E.D. La.
2001) (No. 01-010).
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Id; see also FRANK TIRRO, JAZZ: A HISTORY 328 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1993) (Jazz has also been associated with
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U.S.C. § 1306); the Crackhouse statute, which was designed to “outlaw operation of houses or buildings
(crackhouses) where crack, cocaine and other drugs are manufactured and used.” See 132 CONG. REC. 26,474 (1986)
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352
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that includes both electronic music concerts (small and large) and raves as they have been
defined in this Comment.353
The name of the bill alone speaks volumes. While the acronym RAVE stands for
Reducing Americans’ Vulnerability to Ecstasy, testimony from government officials reveals that
the government’s goal in passing the RAVE Act is not to reduce drug use alone but to reduce
drug use by eliminating the “raves” themselves. For example, shortly after the indictment of the
defendants in the State Palace Theater case under the Crackhouse statute, DEA Administrator
Donnie R. Marshall testified before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control354 that
“[r]aves, under any name, are a lucrative business and are frequently the sites of crimes such as
pharmaceutical diversion, rape, property damage, gang violence, drug sales, robberies, assaults,
and murder.”355 He added that “we are hopeful that more investigations along the lines of the
State Palace Theater investigation will have an impact on shutting down raves.” Notably, he did
not distinguish between legitimate electronic music concerts and illegitimate raves (events where
it is more likely that drugs are present) as the events have been defined throughout this
Comment. This indicates that the agency sought to eliminate all concerts featuring electronic
music, whether legitimate or not.
One can further ascertain the true objective behind the RAVE Act by reading the
Department of Justice’s pamphlet providing a ‘how-to’ guide for shutting down raves.356 This
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See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
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America at Risk: The Ecstasy Threat: Hearing Before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control,
107th Cong. 33 (2001) (statement of Donnie R. Marshall, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration
(“DEA”).
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See Information Bulletin: Raves, National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 2001-L0424-004,
April 2001, at 1, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs/656/656t.htm (last visited June 11, 2004).
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bulletin, published by the Department of Justice’s National Drug Intelligence Center in April
2001, called the State Palace Theater its most successful anti-rave initiative.357 It recommended
a number of tactics to attack raves, and although the Department’s definition of “rave” centers on
modes of expression – music, dance and the visual arts – the goal of the carefully crafted strategy
is to “force rave promoters to move or cease their operations.”358 Congress also relied on the
State Palace Theater case as the catalyst for its assessment of “raves” and a starting point from
which to formulate a national policy about them.359 Between the time the RAVE Act was first
proposed in the Senate and the time it was actually passed, the bill’s sponsors had eliminated the
controversial finding that “the trafficking and use of ‘club drugs’ . . . is deeply embedded in the
rave culture.”360 The government does not even maintain the pretense of targeting drug use at
raves but rather intends to eliminate the events themselves.
3. Substantiality
Recall that the test from Broadrick361 requires that “particularly where conduct and not
merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” (emphasis
added).
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See supra Part V, discussing the State Palace Theater case.
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See S. 2633, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002).
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See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
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If the legitimate sweep of the statute covers the government’s interest in battling the
illegal street drug ecstasy, this covers some electronic music concerts and probably most raves.362
The statute’s overbreadth is both real and substantial because on its face, the law can eliminate
not only all electronic music concerts and all raves, but rock concerts (like the one planned for
Billings), all musical concerts, political rallies and any other type of event one can imagine
provided that there is even the remotest possibility of illegal drug use at the event.
C. The Rationale of The Disorderly House Does Not Translate to the Rave Situation363
The rationale of the disorderly house364 is inapplicable to the rave situation because, as
noted above in the Introduction, there are two types of events: 1) the regulated electronic music
concert, typically held in a nightclub (but sometimes in a larger venue such as an arena); and 2)
the true rave, which is unregulated, held in an open space and is always an event of a grand scale.
A disorderly house statute fits neither of these situations, because an electronic music concert is
not disorderly, and a rave could never be held in a house.
The electronic music concert is orderly. It is organized for profit, under the security and
protective measures implemented by the event promoter, in a venue where the business owner
362

But eliminating raves and electronic music concerts probably does not do much to help the government in its war
on drugs, as drugs that were once considered “underground” drugs for use at raves are now seen at “nightclubs,
concerts, bars, college campuses, shopping malls, and even schools.” See CYNTHIA R. KNOWLES, UP ALL NIGHT: A
CLOSER LOOK AT CLUB DRUGS AND RAVE CULTURE vii (Red House Press 2001); see also Kim Kozlowski, Ecstasy
Use Grows for Suburban Teens; Survey: It’s Almost As Common As Pot, DET. NEWS, Nov. 17, 2003, Special Report
available at http://www.detnews.com/2003/specialreport/0311/18/a01-326994.htm (last visited June 5, 2004), in
which a staffer at an adolescent drug treatment center says one teenager told her “they were passing out ecstasy pills
at her senior prom like they were after-dinner breath mints.” Id. Rich Isaacson, special agent for the DEA, says that
when he talks to parents, he tries to debunk the myth that ecstasy is a rave drug. He says, “It’s a common drug now
wherever teens have a house party. If there is marijuana or alcohol, I would have every expectancy that [e]cstasy
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A disorderly conduct statute, on the other hand, that would (for example) make it unlawful to fail to disperse in
response to a valid police order might be more appropriate for the rave situation. Compare City of Houston, Texas v.
Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (unconstitutionally overbroad disorderly conduct statute) with Colten v. Kentucky, 407
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has taken out the necessary permits under local law365 and does not want to be held liable for the
acts of his clients.366 Unlike the crackhouse owner, who is usually an absentee landlord turning a
blind eye to what is happening within the crackhouse, the nightclub property owner is usually on
the premises or nearby;367 he usually hires an event manager to take active steps to ensure the
safety of those on the premises.368 The State Palace Theater owners, for example, instituted a
zero-tolerance policy369 that absolutely forbid possessing, selling or using drugs on the
premises.370 Signs throughout the venue announced this policy, as well as an offer that free
tickets were to be given to anyone who turned in a person with drugs.371 Security guards refused
to admit people who appeared to be intoxicated.372 Over the past several years, the owners have
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See supra note 190.
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See supra note 214:
Business owners have come to Congress and told us there are only so many steps they can take to
prevent any of the thousands of people who may attend a concert or a rave from using drugs, and
they are worried about being held personally accountable for the illegal acts of others . . .
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See supra note 26. According to Boyd,
Robert Brunet manages the State Palace Theater in New Orleans . . . Mr. Brunet hired James
Estopinal to arrange and promote electronic music concerts – what the government refers to as
“raves” but which are nothing more than musical exhibitions at which disc jockeys (DJ’s) perform
computer-generated electronic music for a crowd of dancers…The prosecution in this case made
no claim that any of these men ever engaged in any drug related activity whatsoever. DEA
officials have implied in other Congressional hearings that the State Palace proprietors somehow
condoned or encouraged drug use. This is not the case, nor was any such claim ever made in the
actual State Palace case . . . .
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(testimony of Graham Boyd, Director, Drug Policy Litigation Project, American Civil Liberties Union),
available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/boyd101002.pdf.
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arranged for many arrests due to their zero-tolerance policy, including the arrests of security
guards who were found to be selling drugs.373
Though DEA agents purchased alleged drugs from 82 different people, almost half of
the purchases did not test positive as a controlled substance.374 The agents did not pursue
investigations or prosecutions for any of these sales at the State Palace.375 The usual method of
arresting the drug dealers themselves was abandoned (in this context, at least) in favor of the
easier route of pursuing the businessmen who provide the music that some drug users and nondrug users alike find entertaining.376
While the maintenance of a place for use, manufacture or distribution of controlled
substances need not be the sole or the main purpose of the premises, it had to be a significant
purpose for prosecution under the Crackhouse statute.377 The primary purpose of a concert hall
or nightclub owner is to provide entertainment, not to maintain a disorderly house where people
know they can go to consume or sell hard drugs. As Senator Grassley stated in his remarks
supporting the RAVE Act: “Clearly, taking steps to reduce or eliminate drug use at an event,
such as the posting of signs or through zero-tolerance instructions to security personnel, are not
373
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(testimony of Graham Boyd, Director, Drug Policy Litigation Project, American Civil Liberties Union),
available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/boyd101002.pdf.
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(last visited June 5, 2004).
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actions that would be taken by someone who would intentionally allow drug use to occur at an
event.”378 Yet people who do take these steps, like the managers of the State Palace Theater, who
had histories of cooperating with law enforcement on combating drug use and distribution, were
the first targets of the DEA in “Operation RAVE Review,” were prosecuted under the
Crackhouse statute and could be prosecuted under the RAVE Act.
Another reason why a disorderly house statute does not pertain to the rave situation is
that the knowledge of the property owner/maintainer in each situation is inherently different.
Recall that unregulated raves are, by definition, large-scale events. Recall too that the
Crackhouse statute applied only to a “building, room or an enclosure.”379 The RAVE Act, on the
other hand, applies to “any place.”380 While courts have recognized that the natural inference is
that those who live in a house with others have sufficient knowledge of what is going on inside,
particularly in the common areas, to satisfy the knowledge requirement of the former Crackhouse
statute Section (a)(2),381 this inference is not readily apparent with respect to large-scale raves.
Nor is this inference apparent with respect to those electronic music concerts held in arenas,
where the event in question may consist of tens of thousands of attendees.382 The natural
inference with both the large-scale electronic music concert and the large-scale rave, is that
someone hosting such a large event would not know of, and could not possibly be held
responsible for, the activities of everyone present.383
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Many disorderly house statutes have been challenged on Constitutional grounds, usually
with charges of vagueness. These statutes have been upheld, mainly because the scienter
requirement included in the statutes allows a court to interpret the statute narrowly, thus avoiding
constitutional difficulties.384 The same cannot be said of an overbroad statute such as the RAVE
Act, as an overbroad statute by definition is one that is not narrowly tailored and does not lend
itself to a narrowing construction by the judicial branch.385
IX. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Electronic music concerts and raves both raise a fairly typical concern within the local
community: noise, at late hours. Noise and event regulations are typically left up to local
government386, and many local governments have already enacted local ordinances designed to
eliminate the undesirable side effects of large parties, like noise, rather than the event itself.
A. The Federal Government Should Defer to Local Government on This Issue
Chicago, Illinois is one large city that passed a city ordinance in May 2000 that would
make building owners responsible for after-hours clubs and rave parties held on their property
and could send the owner to jail for up to six months.387 The "anti-rave" ordinance, as it's been
called, is actually an amendment to the city’s amusement license ordinance. Sponsored by
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Chicago alderman Jesse Granato (1st Ward) and co-sponsored by Chicago alderman Ted Matlak
(32nd Ward), the amendment also makes the property owner/manger, promoter and entertainer
(i.e. the DJ) subject to fines up to $10,000 for using any public place of amusement that does not
have a public place of amusement license.
Likewise, in the south, Gainesville, Florida’s rave committee's final recommendations
include a mandatory 2 a.m. closing time for bars and clubs.388 A 60-day “Dance Hall
Moratorium” was passed in Orange County, Florida that prohibited the opening of new dance
clubs.389 Tampa, Florida’s, city code was amended in the late 1990s to prohibit late-night food
sales to “ravers” but The Tampa City Council is now debating whether to amend the code again,
to better accommodate businesses.390 Responding to club owners' concerns, politicians in
Charlotte, North Carolina, began tinkering in 2000 with the city's proposed rave ordinance. The
ordinance, drawn up by Charlotte-Mecklenburg police, aims to control drug sales and use at
nightclubs by restricting clubs' hours of operation and requiring a permit to operate the club.
The trend for local government to address this issue has also reached the west coast. In
San Bernardino, California, in 2001, the San Bernardino County Board of Supervisors
unanimously approved modifications to the County Development Code affecting Temporary
Special Event permits, resulting in increased requirements for sponsors of special events,
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including music events.391 Seattle's “teen dance ordinance" requires kids under eighteen to be
accompanied to dances by a parent.392
Overall, these local ordinances are based on event and venue permits, and focus on
ensuring that the venues are licensed. These are all rational goals, and well within the state’s
police power to regulate the health, safety and welfare of its citizens. These local regulations are
not unconstitutional because they do not purport to eliminate all events associated with a form of
music.
B. The RAVE Act May Have Driven Electronic Music Concerts Underground
As the Boise experience with raves demonstrates,393 examined in Part V. above, the
RAVE Act may have driven the forum for electronic music underground. This is a serious
problem, because young people who want to hear electronic music will need to go to
underground events, held in unlicensed establishments where there may not be clean facilities or
access to fresh water, and no ambulances waiting nearby in case of an emergency. Thus, the
RAVE Act may have had the ironic effect of harming some of the very people it was intended to
protect.394
X. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS
A. Tailor the Statute With Specific Definitions
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The main constitutional defect with the RAVE Act is its overbreadth. However, an
overbreadth problem can be cured395 if the legislature narrowly tailors the statute so that it
addresses constitutionally valid goals while avoiding the chilling effect that is the hallmark of an
overbroad statute. The main defect with the RAVE Act is that it does not include definitions that
would tailor the statute to the government’s stated objective. Since England has prior experience
with rave culture and remedial laws curtailing this phenomenon, it may be helpful to examine the
English policy with respect to raves.
By the early 1990s, the Tory government, the police, the notoriously sensational English
tabloid press and middle class England had all had enough of “rave culture.”396 The government
acted, passing the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act397 – a disorderly conduct statute.
England’s law provides many and varied legal definitions, including one for a rave, defined as “a
gathering of 100 or more persons (whether or not trespassers) at which amplified music is played
during the night (with or without intermissions) and is such as, by reason of its loudness and
duration and the time at which it is played, is likely to cause serious distress to the inhabitants of
the locality; . . . ” The statute goes on to define rave music as “sounds wholly or predominantly
characterized by the emission of a succession of repetitive beats.”398 The statute also provides
definitions for “entertainment licence,” “exempt person,” “land in the open air,” “local
authority,” “occupier,” “trespasser” and "vehicle”. If Congress had included statutory definitions
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like these399 that distinguished between legitimate electronic music concerts and illegitimate
events like raves, it could have averted the RAVE Act’s overbreadth problem.
Similarly, when the city of Detroit400 sought to amend its 1962 “Anti-Skid Row”
ordinance, to include “adult” movie theaters and bookstores in their law to prohibit aggregation
of such establishments,401 the city council members included a very specific definition of the
types of establishments that should be considered “adult.”402 The Detroit Common Council was
attempting to prevent concentrations of such businesses, as these clusters tend to attract an
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“undesirable quantity and quality of transients.” The same charges have been directed at raves.403
Because of the explicit drafting, Detroit’s amended ordinance was able to survive facial
challenges that the statute was too vague and that it violated First Amendment rights.404
These two examples demonstrate how beneficial it is for a statute to be drafted with
precision. The RAVE Act would certainly benefit from a more concrete description of what a
rave is, including how many people are required to be in attendance, better descriptions of what
places may be considered undesirable for holding a rave, as well as better guidelines for law
enforcement personnel.405 The English law may provide guidance to American legislators in this
respect.
B. Include a Safe Harbor for Legitimate Business Owners
Congress should include a safe harbor for business owners who wish to provide
entertainment featuring electronic music in a licensed venue.
Senator Biden, the staunchest proponent of the RAVE Act, has said that the purpose of
the law is not to prosecute law-abiding club owners.406 But if prosecutions under the RAVE Act
follow the pattern of prosecutions under the Crackhouse statute, more business owners than
“rogue rave promoters” will be punished. The majority of prosecutions that were conducted
under the Crackhouse statute fell under Section (a)(1), where the owner’s purpose is the relevant
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one.407 Only a few Crackhouse prosecutions fell under Section (a)(2),408 where the purpose of the
people using the place - in the electronic music concert or rave context, the event promoters - is
the relevant one. Senator Leahy withdrew his support from the RAVE Act precisely because he
felt that the law did not include sufficient protections for legitimate business owners, whose
liability under the RAVE Act has now been “dramatically increase[d].”409
Law-abiding business owners who take reasonable precautions to prevent incidental drug
use on their premises need protection. One journalist has described club owners’ precautionary
measures as more thorough than an airport security check.410 The owners of the State Palace
Theater went to extraordinary lengths to ensure that the State Palace Theater’s zero tolerance
policy regarding drugs was enforced.411 Despite all these precautions, they were the first venue
holding electronic music concerts to be prosecuted under the Crackhouse statute for holding
“raves.”412
These club owners should not be punished when they are taking reasonable steps to
prevent drug use yet are not in a position to guarantee that the premises are drug-free. Small
business owners need a safe harbor from the RAVE Act that lets them know “what they can do
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to prevent prosecution”413 and gives them criteria to know what reasonable measures Congress
thinks they should take. This safe harbor should extend to those property owners who keep their
premises in conformance with local operating ordinances, cooperate with the local authorities
like police and who take reasonable precautions such as hiring medical and security personnel to
ensure the safety of those on the premises
XI. CONCLUSION
While the deaths of young people experimenting with ecstasy are indisputably tragic, the
RAVE Act is a kneejerk reaction to those occurrences. Here in the United States, it appears that
Congress has formulated its policies based on flawed science, and this has led to a media circus.
As noted in Part II A 2 above, the government (until February 2004) did not allow scientific
experiments for legitimate uses of MDMA to proceed, although scientists have long lauded its
potential for use in psychotherapy. It concluded that the drug had no medical value, based on
scientific studies that are questionable at best and, at times, seriously flawed.414 It has
exaggerated the statistics on how many deaths ecstasy has caused, in both New Orleans and the
state of Florida,415 to justify the draconian RAVE Act.416 The federal government should focus
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less on eliminating electronic music concerts and more on how to prevent distribution of the
street drug ecstasy within this country.
The RAVE Act is unconstitutional because its overbreadth has a real and substantial
impact on First Amendment rights.
The RAVE Act is inequitable, on public policy grounds, to those legitimate business
owners who provide a forum for electronic music and dance (protected forms of expression) yet
cannot guarantee that their properties are completely drug-free. These business owners are better
regulated at the local level. The RAVE Act may also have the disturbing effect of causing more
harm than good, by driving electronic music concerts underground, encouraging the very
environment it was intended to eliminate.
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